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ABSTRACT

There exist various testing methods for XACML policies which vary in their overall
fault detection ability and none of them can detect all the (killable) injected faults except
for the simple policies. Further, it is unclear that what is essential for the fault detection of
XACML policies. To address these issues, we formalized the fault detection conditions in
the well-studied fault model of XACML policies so that it becomes clear what is essential
for the fault detection. We formalized fault detection conditions in the form of reachability,
necessity and propagation constraint. We, then, exploit these constraints to generate a
mutation-based test suite with the goal to achieve perfect mutation score. Additionally, we
have empirically evaluated the cost-effectiveness of various coverage-based testing
methods against the near-optimal test suite from strong mutation-based test generation
(SMT). Rule coverage has good cost-effectiveness such that it achieved better MKPT
scores than SMT in many of the policies; however, it has poor fault detection capability.
Decision coverage is nearly as cost-effective as SMT in most of the policies and it achieves
better mutation score than rule coverage but could not achieve good mutation score in many
of the policies. MC/DC have slightly less MKPT scores than SMT; nonetheless, among
coverage-based testing methods, MC/DC tests have the highest mutation score and hence
could reveal most of the faults. MC/DC even achieved a perfect mutation score for some
policies; however, it still could not maintain good mutation score in all the policies.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
1.1

Background
Access Control (AC) mechanism is a fundamental security mechanism that serves

to limit the access to a system with virtual or physical resources (objects) based on subject
requesting the access. In AC models like IBAC (Identity Based Access Control) or RBAC
(Role-Based Access Control), the solution is based primarily on the identity of a subject
where access to an object will be individually granted to a locally identified subject or
locally defined roles that the subject is a member of. The subject qualifiers, such as identity
and roles, are often insufficient in the expression of real-world AC needs because realworld AC requirements often need to deal with environmental conditions. However,
traditional AC models like RBAC cannot incorporate factors pertaining to environmental
conditions effectively. Environmental conditions include operational or situational context
which are detectable environmental characteristics in which an access request is made.
Environmental characteristics may include the current time, day of the week, a location of a
user, or the current threat level which are independent of subject or object [1].
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) has emerged as a new generation of access
control methods for tackling the afore-mentioned issues. ABAC avoids the need for
capabilities (operation/object pairs) to be directly assigned to a subject (requesters) or to
their roles or groups before the request is made. The ABAC engine can make an authorization
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decision when a subject requests access based on the assigned attributes of the requester, the
assigned attributes of the object, environmental conditions, and a set of policies that are
specified in terms of those attributes and conditions. This arrangement enables policies to
be created and managed without direct reference to potentially numerous users and objects.
Further, users and objects can be provisioned without reference to a policy [1].
ABAC allows us to specify fine-grained access control by combining various
attributes of authorization elements into access control decisions. The attributes are
predefined characteristics of subjects (e.g., job title and age), resources (e.g., data,
programs, and networks), actions, and environments (e.g., current time and IP address). In
ABAC, the subject presents a request to access the resource (object) [1]. The ABAC
mechanism, then, evaluates policies, subject attributes, object attributes and
environmental conditions to make the access control decision for the request. If authorized,
the subject is given access to the resource. This is the core concept of ABAC which is
illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1:

ABAC Concept [1]

XACML is an OASIS standard for ABAC policy specification. It provides both a policy
language and an access control decision request/response language (both written in XML).
The policy language is used to describe general access control requirements, and has
standard extension points for defining new functions, data types, combining logic, etc. The
request/response language is for defining a query to ask whether a given action should be
allowed or not and interpreting the result. The response consists of a decision about whether
the request should be permitted or not. The possible values in response are Permit, Deny,
Indeterminate (an error occurred, or some required value was missing, so a decision cannot
be made) or Non-applicable (the request can’t be answered by this service) [2].
The typical setup in an ABAC system is that someone (subject) wants to take some action
on a resource (object). A subject will make a request to the system which is intercepted by a
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Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) which is responsible for protecting the resources (like a
filesystem or a web server). Once PEP receives a request, it will send the request to a
Policy Decision Point (PDP) which will determine policies that are applicable to the
request and determines whether access should be granted or not. To make an access
decision, PDP needs to evaluate certain attributes for which it makes a query to the Policy
Information Point (PIP) which is responsible for resolving the attribute values required to
make access decisions. Once the PDP gets the required attributes, it makes access decisions
from the applicable policies. The response (decision) is then returned to the PEP which
will enforce the access decision [2]. Figure 1.2 depicts the data flow in an ABAC system.
It also consists of a Policy Administration Point (PAP) which is responsible for management
and administration of policies themselves.
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Figure 1.2:

Data-flow in ABAC [2]

XACML policies may have various faults due to the misunderstanding of access control
requirements, the complexity of access control language, and coding errors. While ABAC
is more expressive than traditional AC methods such as RBAC, however, it is complex,
and its complexity increases the likelihood of the existence of faults resulting in
vulnerabilities as well as the level of difficulty in revealing these vulnerabilities. Research
has shown that XACML policies are subject to a variety of faults, such as incorrect rule
targets, incorrect rule conditions, incorrect rule effects, incorrect targets of policies and
policy sets, and incorrect uses of the rules or policy combining algorithms [3, 4].
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A major means for finding faults in XACML policy is to execute an access control
system with a test suite (a set of test cases). A test case includes test input (access request)
and corresponding test Oracle (expected response). A test fails when the system’s actual
response to the request is different from its expected response. Such failure often indicates
the existence of a fault that may lead to unauthorized access or denial of service.
Current researches on testing XACML policies have commonly used policy mutation
analysis to evaluate the fault detection ability of testing methods. It involves creating
mutants of the policy under test using various mutation operators for a fault model (a set
of the fault types). Each mutant is a variation of the given policy with an injected fault,
which represents an error that a policy writer might make. A mutant is said to be killed if
it fails one or more tests. The fault detection ability of the testing method is indicated by a
mutation score which is the ratio between the number of mutants killed by the test suite
and the total number of non-equivalent mutants.
Existing testing methods [5–12] vary in their overall fault detection ability, however,
none of them can kill all the injected faults except for simple policies. The high-end ratios
were usually obtained for simple policies and does not achieve such high-end ratios in
complex policies. As a result, if these testing methods are applied in testing real-world access
control systems with complex policy, it may not reveal many faults. As a result, it may leave
significant vulnerabilities in the deployed system. In short, the existing approaches are
inadequate for the high assurance of XACML-based access control. Moreover, it remains
unclear what is essential to the fault detection given the fault and cost-effectiveness of
testing various XACML testing methods.
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To overcome afore-mentioned issues, we present a formalization of the fault detection
conditions for illustrating what is essential for the fault detection of XACML policies in
well-studied fault models [4,14,15] of XACML policies. The formalized fault detection
condition is then used for formulating strong mutation-based test generation with the goal
of achieving perfect mutation score. Finally, we have done the empirical study evaluating
test suites from various coverage-based testing methods along with the test suites from strong
mutation-based testing methods. The empirical study involves mutation analysis of various
policies with different levels of complexity to identify fault detection capability and costeffectiveness of each testing method.
1.2

Thesis Statement
The objective of this thesis is threefold. First, we formalize the fault detection

conditions for faults in well-studied fault models of XACML policies. The goal is to make
clear (formal) that what is essential for the fault detection given the fault. The fault
detection condition of a given fault specifies the reachability, necessity, and propagation
constraints that a test must satisfy in the order to reveal the fault. Although the notions of
reachability, necessity, and propagation (a.k.a. sufficiency) constraints originate from
mutation testing or constraint-based software testing [28,30], there is a lack of formal
treatment of these constraints. In particular, the problem with propagation constraints of
software is known to be intractable [29,30] because of the explosion of program execution
paths. In this paper, the unique features of XACML make it feasible to formally represent
the reachability, necessity, and propagation constraints of access control policies in threevalued logic.
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Second, we formulate strong mutation-based test generation by exploiting the
formalized fault detection condition to produce near-optimal test suites for XACML
policies. A test suite for a given policy is said to be optimal if it contains the smallest
number of tests which can achieve 100% mutation score. This paper considers nearoptimality rather than strict optimality because constraints in XACML involve various data
types, functions, and first-order predicates and solving the fault detection condition boils
down to the constraint satisfaction problem, which is known to be undecidable.
Nevertheless, due to the integration of all reachability, necessity, and propagation
constraints for strong mutation testing, our approach is actually able to automatically
generate the near-optimal test suites for all the XACML3.0 policies in the most recent
literature [27]. This distinguishes our work from the existing mutation-based test
generators that only deal with reachability and necessity constraints, a.k.a. weak mutation
testing [20]. Generally, tests generated from weak mutation cannot achieve 100% mutation
score [28, 31]. Further, SMT (strong mutation-based test generation) requires larger test
generation time than all the testing methods discussed in this work. The objective of the
SMT is to evaluate the cost-effectiveness and is not feasible for a policy with the larger
number of the rules. Hence, we also presented NO-SMT (non-optimized strong mutationbased test generation) whose test generation time is greater than MC/DC but still
comparable to it and is feasible to apply for larger policies.
Third, we present the quantitative evaluations of several test generation methods
comparing against a near-optimal test suite (from SMT) of subject policies to establish
cost-effectiveness and fault detection capability. The main testing methods for XACML

9
3.0 policies include rule coverage-based test generation, two forms of test generation with
decision coverage, and two forms of MC/DC test generation [27].
1.3

Method
A fault in a policy is an error or flaw that causes it to produce an incorrect result. A

fault may result in a different output than it is supposed to produce. We can exploit this
difference in result between faulty policy and correct policy to reveal a fault. The idea is to
record the output of the policy for some input when we know that policy is correct. Later,
when we need to determine there exists fault or not, we supply those inputs to the suspect
policy and if the result is different than the previously recorded result, we could conclude
that there exists a fault. A fault policy, however, does not necessarily produce a different
result than the correct policy for all possible inputs. The test inputs must satisfy certain
constraint to produce a different result than from the correct policy and hence reveal the
fault. Such constraints are referred to as fault detection conditions.
1.3.1

Fault Detection Condition (FDC)

The fault detection condition of a given fault specifies the constraints (or condition)
that a test must satisfy to reveal the fault. A test input must satisfy the reachability, necessity
and propagation condition to reveal the fault [18]. This is because to reveal the fault in a
policy, the test must reach the faulty policy element which is termed as reachability
condition. Once it is reached, the test must evaluate the faulty element to produce an
incorrect intermediate result which is different than that from its correct counterpart which
is referred to as necessity condition. If a test does not meet the reachability condition and/or
necessity condition, the correct policy and faulty policy will behave the same and we do
not have a means for detecting the fault. Once the incorrect intermediate result is produced,
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it should play a role to produce a different result in the faulty policy than to the correct
policy which is referred to as propagation condition. Hence, propagation condition is also
essential for fault detection because reachability and necessity condition may only produce
the incorrect intermediate result which may not be visible to the final access control
decision if propagation condition is not met in which case we could not reveal the fault.
Hence, we define fault detection condition with the following three constraints:
a) Reachability(R) constraint: the test must reach the faulty policy element (e.g., rule
target, rule condition, rule effect, policy target, and combining algorithm).
b) Necessity(N) constraint: the test must make the faulty element evaluate to an incorrect
intermediate result which is different from the evaluation result that should be produced by
its correct counterpart.
c) Propagation(P) constraint: the test must make the faulty policy produce an incorrect
response which is different from the expected response that should be produced by the
correct policy.
We then exploit FDC to formulate strong mutation-based test generation.
1.3.2

Strong Mutation-based Test Generation with Fault Detection Conditions

Strong mutation-based test generation involves generating test input that satisfies the
three constraints of the fault detection conditions - reachability, necessity and
sufficiency/propagation for each fault type. If we use only reachability and necessity
constraint to generate test suites, then it is called weak mutation-based test generation and
if we use all three constraints, then it is referred to as a strong mutation. Strong mutation
assures fault detection while weak mutation could not. However, incorporating propagation
constraint is costly and requires a lot of effort that becomes infeasible to apply strong
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mutation [20]. As a result, weak mutation is used in many cases, however, the features of
XACML (being the domain specific language) made it feasible to apply strong mutation.
In fault detection conditions, we specify all possible mutually exclusive constraints for
reachability, necessity and propagation but for mutation-based test generation, we need not
require generating test cases to satisfy all possible cases. For example, if reachability
constraint is “policy target evaluates to true” or “policy target evaluates to an error”, we
may just use “policy target evaluates to true” for fault detection and avoid “policy target
evaluates to an error” to avoid redundant tests and for simplicity. Hence, we identify just
sufficient mutually exclusive conditions from each of the reachability, necessity and
propagation constraints for the fault to be detected. The process of identifying sufficient
constraints to detect a fault involves picking one of the mutually exclusive constraints from
the reachability constraint and concatenating the reachability constraint with corresponding
mutually exclusive necessity constraints and propagation constraints. For example, if the
reachability constraint has two mutually exclusive conditions which are “policy target
evaluate to true” or “policy target evaluate to an error”, we can pick “policy target evaluates
to true” as the reachability constraint. Further, the chosen reachability constraint may have
two mutually exclusive necessity constraints as “rule target evaluates to true” or “rule
target evaluates to an error”. Hence, we concatenate one of the mutually exclusive necessity
constraints, say “rule evaluates to true”. Finally, we concatenate one of the mutually
exclusive propagation constraints corresponding to the chosen necessity constraint, say it
is “all rules with deny effect except the first rule should not evaluate to true”. Hence, the
sufficient constraint to identify the fault is “policy target evaluates to true  rule target
should evaluate to true  all deny rules except the first rule should not evaluate to true”.
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The test suite generated in this way is called a mutation-based test suite. The resulting
test suite may have many redundant test cases which will only kill those mutants which
will be killed by other test cases. In other words, redundant test cases do not kill unique
mutants that are not killed by any other test cases. Hence, such redundant test cases do not
contribute to fault detection capability and result in poor cost-effectiveness of a test suite.
Since our goal is to generate a near-optimal test suite, we need to optimize the test suite.
Let, Mi represents the set of mutants killed by an arbitrary test case ti. By near-optimal, we
mean, if T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} be a near-optimal test suite, then for any arbitrary i and j, such
that i != j, Mi – Mj != empty as well as Mj – Mi != empty i.e each test in a test suite kills at
least one mutant not killed by any other test cases. The reason for generating a near-optimal
test suite is that it can be used for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a test suite from other
testing methods. Hence, we have applied the optimization to find the near-optimal test
suite.
Once we have the near-optimal test cases, we need Oracle value (expected response).
Since we have the original policy which we assume to be correct, we run generated test
inputs on original policy and record its value as Oracle values for a test suite. The optimized
version of strong mutation-based test generation is named as SMT. The optimization
involved in SMT is a costly operation making it infeasible to apply for large policies. We
also formulate strong mutation-based test suite without optimization referred to as NOSMT which has less cost-effectiveness as that of SMT but achieves perfect mutation score.
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1.3.3

Quantitative Analysis

Finally, we do quantitative analysis using metrics like mutation score and mutants
killed per test (MKPT) to determine the cost-effectiveness of major testing methods of
XACML (such as rule coverage, decision coverage, non-error decision coverage, MC/DC
coverage and non-error MC/DC coverage). Mutation score is the percentage of mutants
killed against the number of non-equivalent mutants. It indicates the fault detection
capability of a test method. MKPT is the average number of mutants killed by a test in a
test suite. An optimal test suite will have the highest MKPT score. As a result, we can
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a testing method by comparing the MKPT score of the
test suite from the method under consideration with an optimal test suite. However, finding
an optimal test suite is an undecidable problem and hence, we used the SMT with the
approximation method to optimize the test suite to find near-optimal test suite. The goal is
to compare the MKPT score of a near-optimal test suite with the test suite from the current
method and establish the cost-effectiveness of the testing method.
The rule coverage is the coverage criteria which aims to evaluate the effect of each
rule in the policy. The decision coverage is the coverage criteria which aims to evaluate
each decision point (policy set target, policy target, rule target and rule condition) to three
possible evaluations true, Non-applicable (N/A) and error. Non-error decision coverage is
the same as decision coverage except that it does not consider the error in evaluation of
decision points i.e it aims to evaluate each decision point to only true and N/A [27].
Consider, an expression “resource-id=Liquor ˅ resource-id= Medicine” which is
composed of a disjunction of two constraints “resource-id=Liquor” and “resource-id=
Medicine”. A coverage criterion which satisfies decision coverage and in addition requires
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that every condition in a decision point has taken on all possible outcomes at least once
and each condition has been shown to independently affect the decision’s outcome is
referred to as MC/DC coverage criteria. For example, MC/DC of a conjunctive expression
with n conditions (e.g., c1  …  cn) requires n+1 tests: one test that evaluates all conditions
to true and n tests that evaluate one condition to false and other conditions evaluate to true.
MC/DC of a disjunctive expression with n conditions (e.g., c1 ˅ … ˅ cn) requires n+1 tests:
one test that evaluates all conditions to false and n tests that evaluate one condition to true
and other conditions evaluate to false [27].
1.4

Outline
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the

background and summarizes related work on the research topic. Chapter 3 specifies the
Fault Detection Condition (FDC) for the fault model. Chapter 4 presents the mutationbased test generation, Chapter 5 specifies the quantitative evaluation, and Chapter 6
concludes this work.
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CHAPTER 2

Background and Related Work
2.1

Mutation analysis and mutation-based test generation
Mutation analysis is a fault-based testing technique which provides a testing criterion

that can be used to measure the effectiveness of a test set. The general principle of Mutation
analysis is to produce mutants of the original source/specification by injecting the mistakes
that programmers/users might make. Such faulty programs/specification resulted after
deliberately seeding faults into the original source are called mutants. The statement in
which mutation takes place is called a mutation point and the transformation rules used to
produce such fault and hence mutants are called mutation operators. The resulting faulty
policies (mutants) which exhibit the same behavior as the original ones are known as
equivalent mutants and those which exhibit different behavior than that of the original ones
are called nonequivalent mutants [19].
Mutation operators are defined with respect to a fault model, which is a collection of
the fault types in the programming language. The main hypotheses of mutation testing [19,
32] include: (a) the mutants are based on actual fault models and are representative of real
faults, (b) developers produce programs (policies) that are close to being correct, (c) tests
sufficient to detect simple faults (i.e., in mutants) are also capable of detecting complex
faults. Experiments have shown that mutants are indeed similar to real faults for the
purpose of evaluating testing techniques [16, 33]. To assess the quality of a test set, the
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generated mutants are run against the test set. If the result from a mutant is different from
the original one for any test cases in the input test set, we say that the mutant failed the
test. A mutant is said to be killed if it fails one or more tests. One outcome of the mutation
testing process is the mutation score – mutant killing ratio. Mutant-killing ratio is the ratio
between the number of mutants killed by the test suite against the total number of nonequivalent mutants [3].
Mutation-based test generation derives a test from one or more mutants of a given
program so that the mutant and its original program produce a different execution result.
Such a test needs to meet the following constraints: (a) Reachability constraint: the test
must reach the mutation point, i.e., trigger the execution of the mutated code, (b) Necessity
constraint: the test must make the mutated code evaluate to an intermediate result that is
different from that of the original program, and (c) Propagation (a.k.a. sufficiency)
constraint: the test must make the intermediate result of the mutated code propagate to a
final state that is different from the final state of the original program. We refer to the
collection of reachability, necessity, and propagation constraints as the fault detection
condition. The existing techniques primarily follow the concept of weak mutation testing
[20] that uses the reachability and necessity constraints to generate test inputs [31]. The
main reason is that it has been shown to be intractable to solve the propagation constraint
[28]. This paper aims at strong mutation testing of XACML policies that deal with all
reachability, necessity, and propagation constraints. As a domain-specific language,
XACML has a unique structure that makes it feasible to tackle propagation constraints.
The existing work on mutation testing of XACML policies focuses on mutation tools and
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evaluation of testing methods with policy mutants. In comparison, this paper focuses on
the formalization of the fault detection conditions and mutation-based test generation.
2.2

Introduction to XACML
XACML is a general-purpose access control policy language. The root of an XACML

policy document ℙ is a policy element or a policy set element. A policy set element contains
other child policy elements or policy set elements such that each of which may evaluate
to different access control decisions. A policy element contains a list of the rule elements
each of which may evaluate to different access control decisions. And, there is a mechanism
to resolve decisions from multiple units of the rules within a policy or multiple units of
policies or policy sets within a policy set known as combining algorithms. The combining
algorithm which reconciles decisions from a list of the rules is referred to as rule combining
algorithm. Similarly, the combining algorithm which reconciles decisions from policies or
policy sets is referred to as policy combining algorithm. A policy set, policy or rule element
contains a target element that specifies the set of requests to which it applies. Further, a rule
may consist of another Boolean function known as condition element which needs to be
satisfied for a rule to be applied. Figure 2.1 depicts the XACML policy language model.
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Figure 2.1:

XACML policy language model [2]

As shown in Figure 2.1, the target of a rule, policy, or policy set is a conjunctive
sequence of AnyOf clauses. Each AnyOf clause is a disjunctive sequence of AllOf clauses,
and each AllOf clause is a conjunctive sequence of match predicates. A match element
matches and compares attributes in a request context with the embedded attribute values.
Logical expressions for match predicates and rule conditions are usually defined on four
categories of attributes: subject, resource, action, and environment. They can use a great
variety of predefined functions and data types. A rule also has an effect element which will
be either permit or deny corresponding to the access decision of the rule.
Formally, a policy set element PS is a quintuple < PST, PCA, [P1, P2 , …, Pm], A, O>,
where PST is the policy set target, PCA is the policy combining algorithm, and [P1, P2,…,
Pm] is the list of policies or policy sets in the policy set, A is a set of advice, and O is a set
of Obligation. Each policy Pi is a quintuple <PTi, RCAi, [ri1, ri2 , …, rin], Ai, Oi> , where
PTi is the policy target, RCAi is the rule combining algorithm, and [ri1, ri2 ,…, rin] is the list
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of the rules in the policy, Ai is a set of advice, and Oi is a set of obligation. Each rule Rj is
a triple < rtj, rcj, rej >, where rtj is the rule target, rcj is the rule condition, and rej ∈ {permit,
deny} is the rule effect. < rtj, rcj, permit> is called a permit rule, whereas < rtj, rcj, deny>
is a deny rule. If both rtj and rcj are omitted (always true), then the rule < _, _, rej > is a
default rule. More specifically, < _, _, deny> is a default deny rule, whereas < _, _, permit>
is a default permit rule.
To access the resource, a subject presents an access request to the system. An access
request for an ABAC authorization system consists of a set of attributes. For an access
request q, a policy or policy set responds with an access decision, such as permit or deny.
Given an access request q, PS is evaluated to produce a response (i.e., access decision)
denoted as d(PS, q). A policy set target PST is first evaluated according to the attribute
values in q. If the result of the evaluation is false, then d(PS, q) = N/A otherwise policies
P1, P2,…, and Pm will be evaluated if PST is true or evaluates to an error. d(PS, q) depends
on policy combining algorithm PCA and the decisions of individual policies with respect
to q (denoted as d(Pi, q)). Similarly, for an individual policy Pi = <PTi, RCAi, [r1, r2, …,
rn] >, policy target PTi is evaluated according to the attribute values in q. If the evaluation
result is false, then d(Pi, q)= N/A, otherwise, rules r1, r2,…, and rn will be evaluated. d(Pi,
q) depends on rule combining algorithm RCAi and the decisions of individual rules.
Decision of the rule rj = < rtj, rcj, rej > with respect to q, denoted as d(rj, q), is defined as
follows:
i)

Permit: access is granted when rej = permit and rtj and rcj is true with respect to q.

ii)

Deny: access is denied when rej = deny, and rtj and rcj is true with respect to q.
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iii)

Non-applicable, or simply N/A: q is not applicable, i.e., rtj and/or rcj is false with

respect to q.
iv)

IndeterminateD or simply I(D): An error occurred when rtj or rcj was evaluated

and rej = Deny. The decision could have evaluated to Deny if no error had occurred. A
syntactically valid access request may cause the occurrence of a runtime error for different
reasons, such as missing an attribute value, mismatch of an attribute type, and an exception
of expression and function evaluation.
v)

IndeterminateP or simply I(P): An error occurred when rtj or rcj was evaluated and

rej = Permit. The decision could have evaluated to Permit if no error had occurred.
A rule may have an empty target as well as empty conditions referred to as a default
rule. For a default rule rj= < _, _, rej >, any access request q is d(rj, q) = rej.
The root element of a general XACML policy document ℙ could be either a policy
element or a policy sets element. If the root element is a policy set element, then policy
combining algorithms for the root policy set has nested rule combining algorithms and/or
policy combining algorithms inside it. Since we need to deal with five rule combining
algorithms in our work and if we consider policy sets we need to consider six policy
combining algorithms, such nesting would create lots of combinations of nested combining
algorithms. As a result, for simplicity, further, in this work, we would only consider
XACML policy document ℙ which has a policy element as a root of the XACML document
so that we don’t need to deal with nested rule and policy combining algorithms. With
similar reasoning, we can also deal with policy sets and hence policy combining algorithms
but for simplicity, we only consider policy in this work. Further, Advice and Obligation
plays no role in our work, so we omit them while representing policy elements further in
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this work. Hence, for simplicity, we represent XACML policy document ℙ as P = <PT,
RCA, [r1, r2, …, rn]> where PT is policy target, RCA is rule combining algorithm and [r1,
r2, …, rn] is the list of child rules of P.
2.2.1

Sample Policy

Figure 2.2 presents an example of an XACML policy document which has Policy Id
KmarketBluePolicy. It is a demonstration policy from Balana – Open source
implementation of XACML [13]. The rule combining algorithm of the policy is denyoverrides (line 2). The policy’s target (lines 3-14) implies the constraint “role=blue” where
a role is an attribute in the subject category and blue is the value for the attribute of type
string. For this policy to be applied to a request, the request context must contain the subject
attribute role with the value of blue.
There are three rules with rule ids: deny-liquor-medicine (line 16-37), max-drinkamount (lines 38-61), and permit-rule (line 62). The target of the rule deny-liquor-medicine
(lines 18-36) implies the constraint “resource-id=Liquor” (line 19-26) ˅ “resourceid=Medicine” (lines 27-34), where resource-id is an attribute in the resource category.
Since the rule does not have a condition element, it is true by default, hence, the rule will
result in a “Deny” decision if “resource-id=Liquor ˅ resource-id=Medicine”. The target of
the rule max-drink-amount implies the constraint “resource-id=Drink”, and the condition
the implies constraint “amount > 10”. Thus, the rule results in a deny decision if “resourceid=Drink ˄ amount > 10”. Rule permit-rule has neither target nor condition. It results in a
Permit decision whenever it is reached.
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Figure 2.2.

A sample XACML policy [13]
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Hence, in the notation we described earlier, P = <role =“blue”,deny-overrides ,
[r1,r2,r3]> where r1 = <rt1, rc1, re1>, r2 = <rt2, rc2, re2>, r3 = <rt3, rc3, re3> such that rt1
= “resource-id = Liquor ˅ resource-id = Medicine”, rc1 = true (since its empty), re1 =
deny, rt2 = “resource-id = Drink”, rc2 = “amount > 10”, re2 = Deny, rt3 = true (since its
empty), rc3 = true (since its empty), and re3 = Permit.
To illustrate how an XACML authorization scheme works, we first need to discuss
how each element of XACML evaluation occurs.
2.2.2

Policy Evaluation

When a request is presented to the AC system, it first needs to determine whether the
available set of XACML policies can be applied to a given request or not. For this purpose,
the target element PT of root policy element P of XACML policy document ℙ is used. If it
is empty, the policy is applicable to any request q. If it is not empty and request q meets
the constraints specified by the target PT or if there is an error while evaluating the target
PT, the policy is applicable to request q otherwise policy is not applicable and will not be
evaluated further. The evaluation of policy involves evaluation of its child rules. Once its
child elements are evaluated and it obtains the authorization decision from each child
element, it uses a rule combining algorithm to reconcile the decision obtained from various
child rules and makes a final authorization decision from the result of the rule combining
algorithm [2]. The details on combining algorithms is presented in Section 2.2.5. If policy
target PT evaluates to true, the policy-level decision will be the decision from the rule
combining algorithm itself. However, if PT evaluates to an error, the decision will be made
as described in Section 2.2.3
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2.2.3

Policy Evaluation and Indeterminate Target

If the target of a policy evaluates to an error, the result of policy evaluation will
be N/A whenever the result of the rule combining algorithm is N/A; the result will
be I(P) whenever the result of the rule combining algorithm is permit; the result
will be I(D) if the result of the rule combining algorithm is deny, and the result
will be I(DP) if result of combining algorithm is Indeterminate. For any other
indeterminate result {I(DP), I(D), I(P)} from the rule combining algorithm, the
result for policy evaluation is the same as that for the rule combining algorithm. It
uses a rule combining algorithm to reconcile decisions obtained from various
child rules and makes a final authorization decision from the result of the rule
combining algorithm [2].
2.2.4

Rule Evaluation

The evaluation of ith rule ri occurs if the evaluation of the rules above it does not halt
the evaluation of policy P producing the result d(P,q). The rule ri is applicable to request q
if “rule target rti, as well as rule condition rci, is true” or “rule target rti evaluates to an error”
or “rule target rti is true and rule condition evaluates to an error” [2]. We say rule evaluates
to true, if rule target, as well as rule condition, evaluates to true. Similarly, if rule target or
rule condition evaluates to false, we say rule evaluates to false or N/A. If rule target or rule
condition evaluates to an error, we say rule evaluates to an error.
If a rule evaluates to true, the rule-level decision (d(P,ri)) will be the effect of the rule
i.e if the effect of the rule is permit, then the decision of the rule will be permit. If a rule
evaluates to an error, the rule-level decision will be the Indeterminate of corresponding
effect i.e if the effect is permit, the decision of the rule will be I(P) or simply I(P).
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For a request q, there may be multiple rules which are applicable such that each
produces their effect and it is the job of the rule combining algorithm (RCA) to reconcile
decision of multiple rules and produce the final decision for the policy evaluation. Section
2.2.5 discusses various rule combining algorithms we considered in this work.
Let rca(P, q) denote the result of applying RCA to the rules in P for the request q.
Assuming that the list of the rules in P is non-empty, rca(P, q) ∈ {Permit, Deny, N/A, I(D),
I(P), I(DP)} and per the standard specification [2], d(P, q) is defined as follows:

2.2.5

Combining algorithms

There are eleven RCAs in XACML 3.0. Four of them are for compatibility support for
older versions - legacy ordered-deny-overrides, legacy deny-overrides, legacy orderedpermit-overrides, and Legacy ordered-permit-overrides [2]. As they are for the backward
compatibility for the previous version of XACML, we do not consider them in our work.
Among the remaining seven, the five are listed below and the other two are ordered denyoverrides and ordered permit-overrides. In Balana [13] (an open source implementation of
XACML3.0), the implementations of ordered-deny-overrides and ordered-permitoverrides are the same as deny-overrides and Permit-overrides. As a result, we do not
consider these two as well and this work only focuses on the five RCAs which are as
follows:a)

deny-overrides: deny-overrides is intended for those cases where a deny decision

should have priority over a Permit decision. If any rule evaluates to deny, the result is deny.
If there is no deny decision from any rules and if any decision is I(DP), the result is I(DP).
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If there is no deny and I(DP) decision, and if any decision is I(D) and another decision is
I(P) or deny, the result is I(DP). If it is also not true, then if any decision is I(D), the result
is I(D). If there is no deny, I(DP) and I(D) decision, and if any decision is permit, the result
is permit. If it is also not true and if any decision is I(P), the result is "I(P)" otherwise, the
result is N/A [2].
b)

permit-overrides: permit-overrides RCA is intended for those cases where a permit

decision should have priority over a deny decision. If any decision is permit, the result is
permit. If there is no permit decision and if any decision is I(DP), the result is I(DP). If
there is no permit and I(DP) decision, and if any decision is I(P) and another decision is
I(D) or deny, the result is I(DP). If it is also not true, then if any decision is I(P), the result
is I(P). If there is no permit, I(DP) and I(P) decision, and if any decision is deny, the result
is deny. If it is also not true and if any decision is I(D), the result is I(D) otherwise, the
result is N/A.
c)

deny-unless-permit: This is intended for those cases where a permit decision should

have priority over a deny decision, and an Indeterminate or N/A must never be the result if
the policy is applicable to the request. If any decision is permit, the result is permit
otherwise, the result is deny.
d)

permit-unless-deny: This RCA is intended for those cases where a deny decision

should have priority over a permit decision, and an Indeterminate or N/A must never be the
result. If any decision is deny, the result is deny else the result is permit.
e)

first-applicable: This RCA is intended for those cases where the evaluation of

policy should halt as soon as any rule is applicable to request q. Rules are evaluated in the
order in which they are listed. If a rule’s target matches and condition evaluates to true,
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then the result is rule’s effect (permit or deny). If a rule’s target evaluates to an error or rule
condition evaluates to an error, then the result is I(P) if rule’s effect is permit or I(D) if
rule’s effect is deny. If the target or condition evaluates to false, the next rule is evaluated.
If no further rule exists, then the result is N/A.
To illustrate how XACML policy evaluation occurs, the following section presents
sample requests and discusses how the policy evaluation takes place for the given sample
policy.
2.3

Sample Requests and Policy Evaluation

This section presents some sample requests and how the evaluation occurs in sample
policy. The XACML request contains a list of attributes and their value. Let us consider q1
be the first sample request as q1 = {resource-id =”Liquor”}. This request consists of one
attribute-value pair where resource-id is attribute and Liquor is a value of the attribute.
Since the policy target of sample policy is “role = blue” and q1 does not contain role
attribute, the given sample policy will not be applicable to q1 because the policy target did
not match, and no rules will be evaluated, and the final decision will be N/A.
Let us consider second request q2 as {resource-id =”Liquor” and role = “gold”}.
Since q2 does contain role attribute but it is not blue, the policy will not be applicable
because the policy target did not match, and the final decision of the policy evaluation will
be N/A.
Let us consider a third request q3 as {resource-id =”Liquor” and role = “blue”}.
Since q3 does contain role attribute and is blue the policy will be applicable. Further, it also
consists of another attribute-value pair resource-id = ”Liquor”. As a result, rule 1 is
applicable whose effect is deny and since the RCA is deny-overrides, the rule evaluation
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stops after rule1 and decision of RCA will be deny. Since the PT evaluates to true, the final
decision for the policy evaluation will be deny. However, if PT evaluated to an error, the
final decision for policy would be I(D).
Let us consider a fourth request q4 as {resource-id = ”aFFFF” and role = “blue”}.
Since role attribute is blue, the policy will be applicable. The value of another attribute
resource-id is aFFFF. As a result, rule 1 is not applicable as well as rule 2 because their
target didn’t match. However, rule 3 is a default rule with no target and condition, so it will
be applicable to any request and produces permit effect. Since the rule level decision of the
first two rules are N/A and that of the third rule is permit, the RCA level decision will be
permit. Since PT evaluates to true, the final policy-level decision will be permit.
2.4

Related Work

A test for an XACML policy consists of a test input and the corresponding Oracle
value (i.e., expected response to the access request). Oracle values depend on the access
control requirements of the system under test. A test fails when the system’s actual
response to the request is different from the expected response. Such a failure often
indicates the existence of a fault that may lead to unauthorized access, elevated privilege,
or denial of service. The existing approaches to test generation for XACML policies fall
into two categories: model-based testing that derives tests from models, and policy-based
testing that produces test inputs directly from the policy under test. As access control
policies are extra-constraints on system functions, the model-based testing approach
usually integrates functional models with access control specifications and can generate
both test inputs and Oracle values. This paper is mostly related to the work that generates
test inputs from the XACML policy under test.
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The existing testing methods for XACML policies generate access requests directly
from the policy under test. A user needs to define the expected response for each request
to determine whether each test passes or fails. Martin et. al. generates access requests in
Cirg from counterexamples produced by model checker Margrave [21] through the changeimpact analysis [10]. Mutation score of the testing methods in Cirg ranged from 30% to
60% in different case studies and 100% for a simple policy. Targen [22] obtained mutation
score that ranged from 75% to 79% for different case studies which derive access requests
to satisfy all the possible combinations of truth-values of the attribute id-value pairs found
in a given policy [5]. The X-CREATE framework deals with the structures of the Context
Schema Considering that requests must conform to the XML Context Schema. Bertolino
et al. have developed the Mutant-killing ratios of the X-CREATE framework ranging from
75% to 96% for several small policies [7]. They have also developed other test selection
strategies, such as Simple Combinatorial and Incremental XPT [6].
Mutant-killing ratios of the Simple Combinatorial strategy ranged from 3% to 100%,
whereas mutant killing ratios of the Incremental XPT strategy ranged from 55% to 100%.
Bertolino et al. [8] proposed an approach to selecting tests based on the rule coverage
criterion. It chooses existing tests to match each rule target set, which is the union of the
target of the rule and all enclosing policy and policy set targets. Mutant-killing ratios of
this approach ranged from 62% to 98%. In addition, Bertolino et al. [9] proposed similaritybased metrics for prioritizing existing tests of policies. This work is not concerned with
how the tests are generated, though. Li et al. [12] have developed XPTester, which used
symbolic execution technique to generate requests from XACML policies. They convert
the policy under test into semantically equivalent C Code Representation (CCR) and
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symbolically execute CCR to create test inputs and translate the test inputs to access
requests. Mutant-killing ratios of XPTester ranged from 37% to 93%. Although all the
above work uses mutation to evaluate fault detection ability, there are subtle differences
between the subject policies and the fault models used by different research groups. It is
obvious that the above methods are far from satisfactory for the high assurance of XACML
policies. Most of them produce many tests by combining attribute values. None of them
have considered advanced coverage criteria, e.g., decision coverage and MC/DC, for
access control constraints (i.e., rule target, rule condition, policy target, and policy set
target).
Verification techniques have also been proposed for quality assurance of XACML
policies. The verification system in Margrave checks whether an XACML policy satisfies
given properties that describe the constraints on attributes. Margrave transforms the
XACML policy into multi-terminal binary decision diagrams. Hwang et. al. [23] applied
Margrave to the detection of multiple-duty-related security leakage. Hughes and Bultan
[25] developed an approach for defining properties as partial orderings between XACML
policies, translating them to Boolean formulas, and using the Zchaff SAT solver to check
satisfiability of the Boolean formulas. Hughes and Bultan have also proposed an approach
for translating XACML policies into the Alloy language and analyzing properties as partial
ordering relations [24]. The above verification techniques are premature because they only
deal with a very restricted subset of XACML (e.g., no or limited attribute data types and
no complex conditionals). In addition, they require formal representation of applicationspecific properties, which can be a non-trivial task for XACML users.
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CHAPTER 3

Fault Detection Condition
A fault in a policy is an error or flaw that can make it produce an incorrect result.
Consider, the ith rule of a policy P should have permit effect, but if it is somehow changed
to deny, then there is a fault in the effect of a rule. Since the effect of a rule in a policy is
incorrect, we refer to such a fault as an Incorrect Rule Effect fault. Similarly, if there is a
fault in the target element of a rule, then it is referred to as an Incorrect Rule Target fault.
Incorrect Rule Condition fault represents the fault in the condition element. If a rule is
missing, we refer to such a fault as a missing rule fault. If there is a different combining
algorithm than it is supposed to have, then it is an called Incorrect Rule (Policy) Combining
Algorithm fault.
Table 3.1:

Fault Model

Mutation Operator
Fault Type
No

Name

Meaning

1

CRE

Change Rule Effect

Incorrect Rule Effect

2

RTT

set Rule Target True

Incorrect Rule Target

3

RTF

set Rule Target False

4

RCT

set Rule Condition True

5

RCF

set Rule Condition False

Incorrect Rule Condition
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6

ANF

Add Not Function in
condition

7

RNF

Remove Not Function in
condition

8

RER

REmove a Rule

Missing Rule

9

FPR

First Permit Rule

Incorrect Rule Ordering

10

FDR

First Deny Rule

11

PTT

set Policy Target True

12

PTF

set Policy Target False

13

RPTE

Remove Parallel Target

Incorrect Policy Target

Missing target element

Element
14

CRC

Change Rule Combining

Incorrect

Algorithm

Algorithm

Combining

Similarly, if there is a fault in the ordering of the rules, then it is referred to as an
Incorrect Rule Ordering fault. If either Match element, AnyOf element or AllOf element
of Target element is missing, we refer to such a fault as a Missing Parallel Target Element
fault. If there is a fault in policy target, then we refer to such a fault as an Incorrect Policy
Target fault.
While defining policy, there could exist various faults. The policy with the fault is
referred to as a faulty policy. If P’ is a fault policy of original policy P, then P’ is nothing
but the result of an application of some form of transformation rule that introduces the
fault. For example, the transformation rule could be “change rule effect” which alters the
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effect of the rule from permit to deny and vice versa. In mutation analysis literature, the
transformation rule which results in the faulty policy from the correct one is referred to as
a mutation operator and the faulty policy itself is referred to as a mutant. Table 3.1 consists
of fourteen mutation operators which are categorized into eight faults types. Mutation
operators are defined with respect to a fault model, which is a collection of the fault types
in the given domain of programing language or specification. The details on each mutation
operator in Table 3.1 are discussed in Sections 3.1 through 3.14.
The fault in a policy may result in it to produce an incorrect result i.e. it results in a
different output than it is supposed to produce. We can exploit this difference in result to
reveal a fault by supplying the same input to both original policy and mutant, and if there
is a difference in response, then we could conclude that there exists a fault. A fault policy,
however, does not necessarily produce a different result than the correct policy for all
inputs. The test inputs must satisfy certain conditions to produce a different result than
from the correct policy and hence reveal the fault. Such conditions are referred to as fault
detection conditions.
Hence, the fault detection condition (FDC) of a given fault should specify the
constraints that a test case must satisfy to reveal the fault. As discussed in Section 1.3.1,
the fault detection condition can be formulated with three constraints which are reachability
constraint, necessity constraint and propagation constraint.
a)

Reachability(R) constraint: Reachability constraint specifies that the test must

reach the faulty policy element (e.g., rule target, rule condition, rule effect, policy target,
and combining algorithm). If the faulty element is not evaluated, then the faulty policy will
behave the same as that of the original policy and we cannot distinguish the fault. The first
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rule of a sample policy in Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2 has deny effect with id “deny-liquormedicine”. Consider there is a faulty policy which is same as the original policy except for
the effect of the first rule with id “deny-liquor-medicine” has permit effect instead. To
identify this fault, this rule must be evaluated. To evaluate the rule, the rule should be
reached during policy evaluation. To reach the first rule, the policy target must evaluate to
true or error. Hence, the reachability constraint here is to evaluate policy target to true or
error.
b)

Necessity(N) constraint: The test must make the faulty element evaluate to an

incorrect intermediate result, which is different from the evaluation result that should be
produced by its correct counterpart. For example, for the fault considered in reachability
constraint above, the rule target and/or condition of the faulty rule should evaluate to an
error or true so that it produces an incorrect intermediate result. Hence, the necessity
constraint is “rule target and rule condition of the faulty rule does not evaluate to N/A”
(i.e. either rule target and condition evaluates to true or rule target evaluates to an error or
rule target evaluates to true and rule condition evaluates to an error).
c)

Propagation(P) constraint: The test must make the faulty policy produce an

incorrect response, which is different from the expected response that should be produced
by the correct policy. For example, to propagate incorrect intermediate results for revealing
the fault specified in reachability constraint, all the other rules with deny effect except the
first rule should not evaluate to true i.e. either they should evaluate to an error or false
because the rule combining algorithm is deny-overrides and if any another deny rule
evaluates to true, it will produce the deny result in both faulty and correct policy.
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We use the notation PT, PT and Error (PT) to denote that policy target evaluates to
true, N/A and error respectively. We mention rule evaluates to true if both target and
condition of the rule evaluates to true. We use the expression rbi = (rti  rci) to denote that
the target, as well as condition of ith rule, evaluates to true. Similarly, Error(rbi) denotes
an error in the evaluation of the target or condition of the rule ri. Further,  rbi denotes
either rti or rci evaluates to false such that rule is N/A. Additionally, if none of the attributes
in the request context matches the attributes in the rule target or rule condition, then the
rule is not applicable for the request. We use the notation I(P), I(D) and I(DP) to denote
Indt, I(P) and Indeterminate respectively. We use the notation ri = <rbi, rei> whenever
possible to represent ith rule <rti, rci, rei> for simplicity. Further, we interchangeably use
notation ri or current rule under consideration to denote an arbitrary ith rule.
3.1

FDC for Change Rule Effect (CRE)
Change Rule Effect (CRE) is a mutation operator for the incorrect rule effect fault type

in which there is a fault in effect of a rule element. Since there are only two possible rule
effects - permit or deny, there will be a fault in effect of a rule if the effect of a rule gets
altered from permit to deny and vice-versa. The flipping of the rule effect is the only
mutation operator for incorrect rule effect fault.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> where PT is Policy Target, RCA is
Rule Combining Algorithm and RL = [r1, r2, …, rn] is a list of the rules. If the effect of ith
rule ri is flipped to deny by some incident, then the resulting policy will be P’ as shown in
Table 3.2. Since ith rule is supposed to have permit effect but in P’ it is deny, so P’ is the
faulty policy. Here, P’ is called the Change Rule Effect (CRE) mutant of P.
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Table 3.2:

A Faulty Policy with an Incorrect Rule Effect
Correct Policy P

Faulty Policy P'

Policy target

PT

PT

Rule combining algorithm

Permit-Overrides

Permit-Overrides

Rules R

r1

<rb1, re1>

r1

<rb1, re1>

…

…

…

…

ri

<rbi, Permit>

ri’

<rbi, Deny>

…

…

…

…

rn

<rbn, ren>

rn

<rbn, ren>

Since the fault detection condition depends on the rule combining algorithm (RCA) of
a policy, we present fault detection condition for each of the RCA.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
The reachability constraint must trigger the evaluation of the rule with faulty effect i.e.

it should result in the evaluation of ith rule in both P and P'. The rules in a policy will only
be evaluated if the policy target is true or evaluates to an error. Further, when the rulecombining algorithm is Permit-overrides, rule ri will not be triggered if there is a permit
rule before rule ri that evaluates to a permit decision. Thus, the reachability constraint is for any permit rule rj (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e. it should be
N/A or evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
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In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint should make ith rule ri in P and rule ri’ in P' produce a different

rule-level decision. This requires that rbi should evaluate to either true so that the ith rule
decision will be permit in P and deny in P’ respectively or should evaluate to an error so
that rule decision will be I(P) in P and I(D) in P’. If rbi evaluates to N/A, the rule level
decisions will be N/A in both P and P’ in which case we cannot distinguish the faulty
policy. Hence, formally, necessity constraint is rbi ˅ Error(rbi).
iii)

Propagation constraint
Given a faulty element produces different intermediate results, the propagation

constraint must make P and P' produce a different policy-level decision. In other words,
the different intermediate result from necessity constraint should contribute to producing a
different policy-level decision. For this, any permit rule rj (j>i) after ri, rj should not
evaluate to a permit decision, otherwise, d(P, q)= d(P', q) = Permit. The test must make
rbj evaluate to N/A or error for each permit rule rj (j>i). Therefore, the propagation
constraint can be formalized as  rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj = <rbj, Permit> (j>i).
Let, Ϸ = “ rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj = <rbj, Permit> (j>i)”. Ϸ is sufficient for
propagation if necessity constraint is - rbi evaluates to true. However, when rbi evaluates
to an error, Ϸ is not sufficient for propagation.
We can verify that when rbi evaluates to true, Ϸ is sufficient for propagation by
showing that it holds for all possible evaluation of other rules (all the rules in the policy
except the current rule under consideration) as shown in Table 3.3. Let, the ith rule in the

38
correct policy P has permit effect, then that of the faulty policy P’ will be deny effect. The
result of the RCA depends on the result of evaluation of other rules including that of ith rule.
Table 3.3 presents the possible cases for the evaluation of other rules (in the second
column), along with the evaluation of ith rule in P and P’ (in third and fourth column
respectively) and result of RCA for both P and P’ (in fifth and sixth column respectively).
As shown in Table 3.3, there is the possibility of four possible evaluation of other rules.
The first possible evaluation is that - all other rules evaluate to N/A and produces no
effect. In this case, the effect of ith rule in P - which is permit - will be the RCA level
decision for P and that of P’ will be deny since its ith rule has deny decision. When only
one rule evaluates to permit, the result of permit-overrides RCA is permit. Similarly, when
only one rule evaluates to deny, the result of permit-overrides RCA is deny. As a result,
the RCA level decision is permit and deny in P and P’ respectively as shown in the fifth
and the sixth column of the first row respectively. The policy level decision depends on the
result of RCA and how policy target evaluates as discussed in Section 2.2.2 and Section
2.2.3. When PT evaluates to true the policy-level result of P and P’ will be the result of
corresponding RCA i.e permit in P and deny in P’. Similarly, when PT evaluates to an
error, the result of P and P’ will be the Indeterminate of the result of RCA i.e the policylevel result of P is I(P) and that of P’ is I(D).
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Table 3.3:

Possible Evaluations Of Other Rules when Rbi Evaluates to True
other rules than ith rule

Produces

all other rules evaluate to N/A

effect

and produces no effect.
One or more rule produces deny

ith rule

ith rule

RCA

RCA

in P

in P’

in P

in P’

Permit

Deny

Permit

Deny

Permit

Deny

Permit

Deny

Permit

Deny

Permit

I(DP)

Permit

Deny

Permit

I(DP)

or I(D) effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P)
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P),
one or more rule produces deny
or I(D) effect and rest are N/A

Note: There is the possibility of another permit rule to be true but when it happens we could
not detect the fault and the mutant will be equivalent to policy for such set of requests which makes
another permit rule evaluates to true. Hence, for simplicity, we do not consider such cases in this
table as well as in another table like this.

The second possible evaluation is when one or more deny rule produces a deny or I(D)
effect and the rest are N/A. In this case, since the RCA is permit-overrides, the result of
RCA in P is permit because ith rule has permit effect and if any rule evaluates to permit, the
result of permit-overrides is permit. In P’, ith rule evaluated to deny, one or more rules
evaluated to deny or I(D) and other rules evaluated to N/A i.e none of the rules evaluated
to permit or I(P). When RCA is permit-overrides, if none of the rules evaluate to permit or
I(P) and any one of the rules evaluate to deny, the RCA level decision will be deny. As a
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result, the RCA level decision of P’ is deny. When PT evaluates to true the result of P’ will
be deny and that of P is permit. Similarly, when PT evaluates to an error the result of P’ is
I(D) and that of P is I(P) which are different.
The third possible evaluation is when one or more permit rules produces I(P) effect
and the rest are N/A. In this case, the result of RCA in P is permit since ith rule has permit
effect. For P’, ith rule evaluates to deny and since one or more rules evaluated to I(P), the
result of RCA will be I(DP). As a result, when PT evaluates to true the result of P’ will be
I(DP) and that of P is permit which is different. Similarly, when PT evaluates to an error
the result of P’ is I(DP) and that of P is I(P) which are different.
The fourth possible evaluation is one or more rules produces I(P) effect, one or more
rules produces deny or I(D) effect and the rest are N/A. In this case, the result of RCA in P
is still permit since ith rule has permit effect and that of P’ will be I(DP). As a result, when
PT evaluates to true the result of P’ will be I(DP) and that of P is permit which is different.
Similarly, when PT evaluates to an error the result of P’ is I(DP) and that of P is I(P) which
are different.
Hence, when rbi evaluates to true, Ϸ is sufficient for propagation as it holds for all
possible evaluation of other rules.
When rbi evaluates to an error, Ϸ is not sufficient for propagation. Table 3.4 presents
the rationale why Ϸ is not sufficient for propagation when rbi evaluates to an error.
With similar reasoning as for Table 3.3, we can evaluate the result for RCA in P and
P’ as shown in Table 3.4. As listed in Table 3.4, the result of RCA in P and P’ for the first
three possible cases are different. Hence for them, Ϸ is sufficient for propagation i.e fault
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detection. However, for the fourth case, the result of RCA in both P and P’ is I(DP). Since
the result of RCA is not different and hence the policy level decision will not differ.
Table 3.4:

Possible Evaluations of Other Rules when Rbi Evaluates to Error
other rules than ith rule

Produces

No effect from other rules as all

effect

of them evaluates to N/A
One or more rule produces deny

ith rule

ith rule

RCA

RCA

in P

in P’

in P

in P’

I(P)

I(D)

I(P)

I(D)

I(P)

I(D)

Permit

I(DP)

or I(D) effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P)

/I(P)
I(P)

I(D)

I(DP)

I(D)

I(P)

I(D)

I(DP)

I(DP)

effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P),
one or more rule produces deny
or I(D) effect and rest are N/A

Hence, Ϸ is insufficient for propagation for the fourth case when rbi evaluates to an
error. As a result, when rbi evaluates to an error, in addition to Ϸ, we need additional
constraint in propagation constraint. The required additional constraint is - there should not
exist a pair of the rules (excluding ith rule) such that one of them has permit effect which
evaluates to an error and other has deny effect which evaluates to true or error. If this
constraint is satisfied, then the fourth case in Table 3.4 will never occur and we can
distinguish the fault and if this constraint is violated the fourth case will occur in which
case we cannot distinguish the faulty policy.
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Hence, the propagation constraint when rbi evaluates to an error is that - any permit
rule rj (j>i) after ri should not evaluate to a permit decision and there should not exist a
pair of the rules (excluding ith rule) such that one of them has permit effect which evaluates
to an error and other has deny effect which evaluates to true or error. Formally, additional
constraint to Ϸ can be specified as ( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>)
˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd)).
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of CRE when RCA is permit-overrides.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ { rbi} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
j != i})
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {Error(rbi)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ (rd = < rbd,
deny>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
b)

Deny-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. Further, when the rule-

combining algorithm is deny-overrides, rule ri will not be triggered if there is a deny rule
before rule ri that evaluates to a deny decision. Thus, the reachability constraint is that for
any deny rule rj (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
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Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with deny effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule
rj = <rbj, deny> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint

rbi should evaluate to either true so that the ith rule decision will be permit in P and deny
in P’ respectively or should evaluate to an error so that rule decision will be I(P) in P and
I(D) in P’. If rbi evaluates to N/A, the rule level decisions will be N/A in both P and P’ in
which case we can not distinguish the faulty policy. Hence, formally, necessity constraint
is rbi ˅ Error(rbi).
iii)

Propagation constraint

Any deny rule rj (j>i) after ri, rj should not evaluate to a permit decision, otherwise, d(P,
q)= d(P', q) = Deny. The test must make rbj evaluate to N/A or error for each deny rule rj
(j>i). Therefore, the propagation constraint can be formalized as  rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for
any rule rj = <rbj, Deny> (j>i).
The afore-mentioned propagation constraint is sufficient for propagation if necessity
constraint is rbi evaluates to true but is not sufficient when rbi evaluates to an error. With
similar reasoning as for permit-overrides, we can state that when rbi evaluates to an error,
we need additional constraint for propagation. The required additional constraint is “any
deny rule rj (j>i) after ri should not evaluate to a deny decision and there should not exist
a pair of the rules (excluding ith rule) such that one of them has deny effect which evaluates
to an error and other has permit effect which evaluates to true or error”. Formally,
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additional constraint is ( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ (rd = <
rbd, deny>) ˄ Error(rbd) ˄ (Error(rbp) ˅ rbp)).
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of CRE when RCA is deny-overrides.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbi}˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j !=
i})
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {Error(rbi)}˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbj, deny>
for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>)
˄ Error(rbd) ˄ (Error(rbp) ˅ rbp))})
Note: The fault detection condition for permit-overrides is symmetrical with fault detection
condition for deny-overrides such that the role of the permit and deny effect are interchanged.
Hence, for simplicity, we would only consider permit-overrides onwards for other faults.

c)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint

The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. When the RCA is denyunless-permit, rule ri will not be triggered if there is a permit rule before rule ri that
evaluates to a permit decision. Thus, the reachability constraint is that for any permit rule
rj = <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A
or evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
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In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}.

Necessity constraint

deny-unless-permit results permit decision only if at least one of the rules with permit effect
evaluates to true, otherwise, it is deny in all other cases. As a result, we could not consider
the error condition in the ith rule because if there is error in the ith rule target and/or
condition, it will contribute to deny decision for the RCA in both P and P’ irrespective of
its effect. Hence, both P and P’ will behave similarly if the current rule under consideration
evaluates to an error. As a result, the necessity constraint should be the only rbi evaluates
to true. Formally, necessity constraint is rbi.
iii)

Propagation constraint

Any permit rule rj (j>i) after ri, rj should not evaluate to a permit decision, otherwise, d(P,
q)= d(P', q) = Permit. The test must make rbj evaluate to N/A or error for each permit rule
rj (j>i). Therefore, the propagation constraint can be formalized as  rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for
any rule rj = <rbj, Permit> (j>i).
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of CRE when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ { rbi} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = < rbj, Permit >for
j != i})
d)

permit-unless-deny:

i)

Reachability constraint
When the RCA is permit-unless-deny, rule ri will not be triggered if there is a deny

rule before rule ri that evaluates to a permit decision. Thus, the reachability constraint is
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that for any deny rule rj (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be
N/A or evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with deny effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule
rj = <rbj, deny> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint

permit-unless-deny results deny only if at least one of the rules with deny effect evaluates
to true, otherwise, it is permit in all other cases. As a result, we could not consider the error
condition in the ith rule because if there is error in the ith rule target and/or condition, it will
contribute to permit decision for the RCA in both P and P’ irrespective of its effect. As a
result, the necessity constraint should be the only rbi evaluates to true. Hence, formally,
necessity constraint is rbi.
iii)

Propagation constraint
Any deny rule rj (j>i) after ri, rj should not evaluate to a deny decision, otherwise, d(P,

q)= d(P', q) = Deny. The test must make rbj evaluate to N/A or error for each deny rule rj
(j>i). Therefore, the propagation constraint can be formalized as  rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for
any rule rj = <rbj, Deny> (j>i).
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of CRE when RCA is permit-unless-deny.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ { rbi} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = < rbj, Deny >for j
!= i})
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Note: The fault detection condition for deny-unless-permit is symmetrical with fault
detection condition for permit-unless-deny such that the role of the permit and deny effect are
interchanged. Hence, for simplicity, we would only consider deny-unless-permit for other faults.

e)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
When the rule-combining algorithm is first-applicable, rule ri will not be triggered if

there is any rule before rule ri that evaluates to true or error. Thus, the reachability
constraint is that - the policy target is true or evaluates to an error and for any rule rj (j<i)
before rule ri, rbj should evaluate to N/A.
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj) for any rule rj for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
rbi should evaluate to either true so that the ith rule decision will be permit in P and

deny in P’ respectively or should evaluate to an error so that rule decision will be I(P) in
P and I(D) in P’. If rbi evaluates to N/A, the rule level decisions will be N/A in both P and
P’ in which case we cannot distinguish the faulty policy. Hence, formally, necessity
constraint is rbi ˅ Error(rbi).
iii)

Propagation constraint

First-applicable RCA for CRE does not require explicit propagation constraint because
reachability and necessity constraint is enough for fault detection.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of CRE when RCA is first-applicable.
{PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbi ˅ Error(rbi)} ˄ {rbj) for any rule rj for j < i}
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3.2

FDC for Rule Target True (RTT)
Rule target true is a mutation operator which alters the rule target such that it will

always evaluate to true. One of the transformation rules to make target always evaluate to
true is to make it empty so that it will always evaluate to true. Since it has a fault in the
target of the rule, it is under the category incorrect rule target.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, …. ,ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri’, ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’, rci,
rei> such that P’ is similar to P except the target rti’ of ith rule ri’ in P’ always evaluates to
true. Here, P’ is called the Rule Target True (RTT) Mutant of P. The fault detection
condition for Rule Target True based on RCA are given below.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should
not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule target evaluates to N/A or error and rule

condition evaluates to true. Formally, (rti ˅ Error(rti)) ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule target evaluates to N/A and ith rule effect is

deny, then all other rules should evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist a
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pair of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is
permit rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or
error.
({PT)} ˄  rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to N/A and ith rule effect
is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other rules with
permit effect should not evaluate to true. Further, there should not exist a pair of the rules
(excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit rule which
evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄  rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule target evaluates to N/A and ith rule effect is
permit, then all other permit rules should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT} ˄  rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to N/A and ith rule effect
is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny rules
evaluate to N/A. However, if any deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another permit
effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
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({Error(PT)} ˄  rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd
˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule effect
is deny, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A and all other rules
should with deny effect should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule rj = <rbj,
deny> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i}
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is deny, then we cannot detect the fault and mutant will behave the same as original
policy for these set of requests.
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule effect
is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A.
({PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all other
deny rules evaluatesto an error. However, if any one deny rule evaluates to true or error,
another permit rule can evaluate to an error or N/A.
({Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ {∃d (
rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj)) for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i}])
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Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTT when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT} ˄  rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄
{( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp)
˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄  rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj
= <rbi, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i}˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({PT} ˄  rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄  rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d
( rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj =
<rbi, permit> for j != i }])
˅
({PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule rj =
<rbj, deny> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i}
˅
({PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit>
for j != i})
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˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅
{∃d ( rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj)) for any permit rule rj =
<rbj, permit> for j != i}])
We can verify the validity of this fault detection condition by adopting similar
reasoning that we applied for CRE. Let ith rule have deny effect. The result of the RCA
depends on the result of evaluation of other rules as well as that of ith rule. Table 3.5
presents the possible cases for evaluation of other rules and result of RCA for both P and
P’.
With similar reasoning as for Table 3.3, we can list the records in Table 3.5. The final
case in Table 3.5, when one or more rules (excluding ith rule) produces I(P) effect and one
or more other rules produces deny effect and rest of the rules are N/A, the result of RCA is
similar in both P’ and P (which implies that we cannot detect fault under those conditions).
Additionally, in the second case - when one or more of the other rules evaluate to deny and
rest as N/A, the result of RCA in P and P’ are same. Hence from Table 3.5, we can conclude
that if the effect of ith rule is deny then for fault detection, all the rules except the ith rule
should not be true and there should not exists a pair of the rules (excluding ith rule) such
that one of them has deny effect, another has permit effect, permit rule evaluates to an error,
and deny rule evaluates to true or error.
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Table 3.5:

Possible Evaluations of Other Rules When Rti Evaluates to N/A and Ri
Is Deny Rule in P
other rules than ith rule

ith rule

ith rule

RCA

RCA

in P

in P’

in P

in P’

Produces

No effect from other rules as all N/A

deny

N/A

deny

effect

of them evaluates to N/A
deny

deny

deny

deny

I(D)

deny

deny

I(P)

I(DP)

deny

I(DP)

I(DP)

One or more rule produces deny N/A
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(D) N/A
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P) N/A
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P), N/A
one or more rule produces deny
or I(D) effect and rest are N/A

Further, if PT evaluates to an error then the result of both P and P’ will be I(D) for the
third case when one or more other rules with deny effect evaluate to I(D). Hence, when PT
evaluates to an error, the fault detection condition is such that other rules with permit effect
can evaluate to an error while that with deny effect should evaluate to N/A.
Now consider the effect of ith rule is permit instead of deny. In such case, Table 3.6
presents the possible cases for evaluation of other rules and result of RCA for both P and
P’.
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Table 3.6.

Possible Evaluations of Other Rules When Rti Evaluates to N/A And
Ri is Permit Rule in P
other rules than ith rule

ith rule

ith rule

RCA

RCA

in P

in P’

in P

in P’

permit

N/A

permit

permit

deny

permit

permit

I(D)

permit

permit

I(P)

permit

permit

I(DP)

permit

Produces

No effect from other rules as all N/A

effect

of them evaluates to N/A
One or more rule produces deny N/A
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(D) N/A
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P) N/A
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P), N/A
one or more rule produces deny
or I(D) effect and rest are N/A

It is evident from the cases in Table 3.6 that when the effect of the ith rule is permit, it
can identify the fault if none of the other permit rule evaluates to true.
Further, if PT evaluates to an error then result of both P and P’ will be I(P) for the
fourth case when the rule with the permit effect evaluates to an error. Hence, when PT
evaluates to an error, the fault detection condition is such that rules with the permit effect
can only evaluate to N/A. However, if there is an another deny rule which does not evaluate
to N/A then there could be a permit rule which evaluates to an error which is nothing but
the final case in which case we can distinguish the fault.
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Now, let’s consider the situation when ith rule target evaluates to an error. Table 3.7
presents the possible cases for evaluation of other rules and result of RCA for both P and
P’. From Table 3.7, it is evident that fault can be detected only when other rules with permit
effect evaluate to N/A and rules with deny effect do not evaluate to true.
Table 3.7:

Possible Evaluations of Other Rules When Rti Evaluates to Error And
Ri is Deny Rule in P
other rules than ith rule

ith rule

ith rule RCA

RCA

in P

in P’

in P

in P’

Produces

No effect from other rules as all of I(D)

deny

I(D)

deny

effect

them evaluates to N/A
deny

deny

deny

deny

I(D)

deny

deny

I(DP)

I(DP)

deny

I(DP)

I(DP)

One or more rule produces deny I(D)
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(D) I(D)
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P) I(D)
effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P), I(D)
one or more rule produces deny or
I(P) effect and rest are N/A

Further, if PT evaluates to an error then result of both P and P’ will be the same in all
cases and hence mutant behaves similarly as original policy.
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Now consider the effect of ith rule is permit instead of deny. In such case, Table 3.8
presents the possible cases for evaluation of other rules and result of RCA for both P and
P’.
Table 3.8.

Possible Evaluations of Other Rules when Rti Evaluates to Error and
Ri is Permit Rule in P
other rules than ith rule

ith rule

ith rule

RCA in

RCA in

in P

in P’

P

P’

permit

I(P)

permit

permit

I(DP)

permit

permit

I(DP)

permit

permit

I(P)

permit

permit

I(DP)

permit

Produces

No effect from other rules as I(P)

effect

all of them evaluates to N/A
One or more rule produces I(P)
deny effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P)
I(D) effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P)
I(P) effect and rest are N/A
One or more rule produces I(P)
I(P),

one

or

more

rule

produces deny or I(D) effect
and rest are N/A

It is evident from the above cases in Table 3.8 that when the effect of the ith rule is
permit, it can identify the fault if all other permit rules does not evaluate to true.
Further, if PT evaluates to an error then the fault detection condition is such that other
rules with permit effect cannot evaluate to true or error if all of the deny rules evaluate to
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N/A. However, if at least one other deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another permit
rule can evaluate to an error or N/A.
Note: We can establish the validity of the fault detection condition for all faults with similar
reasoning as we did above for CRE and RTT. Hence, further in this work for simplicity, we only
specify the fault detection condition precisely.

b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint

The target of the rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error and condition
should evaluate to true. Formally, (rti ˅ Error(rti)) ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be deny, and, in original policy, it will be N/A or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both of them will behave the same.
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Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect after the ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTT when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {(rti ˅ Error(rti)) ˄ rci } ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule
rj = < rbj, permit >for j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint

If policy target evaluates to true, the necessity constraint is that – rule target evaluates to
N/A or error and rule condition evaluates to true.
If policy target evaluates to an error, the necessity constraint is that – rule target
evaluates to N/A and rule condition evaluates to true.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule target evaluates to false, then for all other

rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error and ith rule target evaluates to false, then for all
other rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A.
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule target evaluates to an error, then explicit
propagation constraint is not required such that reachability and necessity constraint are
enough for fault detection.
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Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTT when RCA is first-applicable.
({PT} ˄  rti ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj such
that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
(Error(PT)} ˄  rti ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule rj such that
rei = rej for j > i})
˅
(PT ˄ Error(rti) ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i})
3.3

FDC for Rule Target False (RTF)
Rule target false is a mutation operator which alters the rule target such that it will

always evaluate to false. One of the transformation rules to make target always evaluate to
false is to introduce new constraint in the target with a random attribute which will always
be false. Since it has a fault in the target of the rule, it is under the category incorrect rule
target.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, ,…. , ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri’, ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’, rci,
rei> such that P’ is similar to P except the target rti’ of ith rule ri’ in P’ always evaluates to
false. Here, P’ is called the Rule Target False (RTF) Mutant of P. The fault detection
condition for Rule Target False based on RCA are given below.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
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Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rule with permit
effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should
not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule target evaluates to true or error and rule

condition evaluates to true. Formally, (rti ˅ Error(rti)) ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule target evaluates to true and ith rule effect is

deny, then all other rules should evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist a
pair of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is
permit rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or
error.
({PT)} ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to true and ith rule effect
is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other rules with
permit effect should not evaluate to true. Further, there should not exist a pair of the rules
(excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit rule which
evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.

61
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule target evaluates to true and ith rule effect is
permit, then all other permit rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to true and ith rule effect
is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny rules
evaluate to N/A. However, if any deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another permit
effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd ˅
Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
If policy target evaluates to true or error, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule
rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j != i}
If policy target evaluates to true or error, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A.
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({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i})
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTF when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄
{( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp)
˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj =
<rbi, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i}˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d (
rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rti)˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j != i}
˅
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({PT ˅ Error(PT))} ˄ Error(rti) ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj
= <rbj, permit> for j != i})
b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The target of the rule under consideration should evaluate to true and condition should

evaluate to true. Formally, rti ˄ rci.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be N/A, and, in original policy, it will be true or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both will behave the same.
Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect evaluate to N/A or error.
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Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTF when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {(rti) ˄ rci } ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule rj = < rbj, permit
> for j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, the necessity constraint is that – rule target evaluates

to N/A or error and rule condition evaluates to true.
If policy target evaluates to an error, the necessity constraint is that – rule target
evaluates to N/A and rule condition evaluates to true.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule target evaluates to true, then for all other

rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule target evaluates to an error, then for all
other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to
N/A or true
If policy target evaluates to an error and ith rule target evaluates to an error or true,
then for all other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should
evaluate to N/A.
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Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTF when RCA is first-applicable.
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj such
that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({PT } ˄ Error(rti)˄ rci ˄ {rbj ˅rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule rj
such that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({Error(PT) } ˄ (rti ˅Error(rti)) ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any
rule rj such that rei = rej for j > i})
3.4

FDC for Rule Condition True (RCT)
Rule condition true is a mutation operator which alters the rule condition such that it

will always evaluate to true. One of the transformation rules to make condition always
evaluate to true is to make it empty so that it will always evaluate to true. Since it has a
fault in the condition of the rule, it is under the category incorrect rule condition.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, …., ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri’, ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’, rci,
rei> such that P’ is similar to P except the condition rci’ of ith rule ri’ in P’ always evaluates
to true. Here, P’ is called the Rule Condition True (RCT) Mutant of P. The fault detection
condition for Rule Condition True based on RCA are given below.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
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Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit
effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should
not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule condition evaluates to N/A or error and rule

target evaluates to true.
Formally, (rci ˅ Error(rci)) ˄ rti
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to N/A and ith rule effect

is deny, then all other rules should evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist
a pair of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is
permit rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or
error.
({PT)} ˄  rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄
{( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp)
˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to N/A and ith rule
effect is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules with permit effect should not evaluate to true. Further, there should not exist a pair
of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit
rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
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({Error(PT)} ˄  rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to N/A and ith rule effect
is permit, then all other permit rules should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT } ˄  rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to N/A and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny
rules evaluate to N/A. However, if any deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another
permit effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄  rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd
˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is deny, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules should with deny effect should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule rj = <rbj,
deny> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i}
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule target evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is deny, then we cannot detect the fault and mutant will behave the same as original
policy for these set of requests.
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If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A.
({PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit>
for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all other
deny rules evaluate to an error. However, if any one deny rule evaluates to true or error,
another permit rule can evaluate to an error or N/A.
({Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ {∃d (
rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj)) for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i}])
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RCT when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT } ˄  rci ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄
{( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp)
˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄  rci ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj
= <rbi, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i}˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
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({PT } ˄  rci ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj =
<rbi, permit> for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄  rci ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d
( rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj =
<rbi, permit> for j != i }])
˅
({PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any deny rule rj =
<rbj, deny> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i}
˅
({PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj, permit>
for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅
{∃d ( rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj)) for any permit rule rj =
<rbj, permit> for j != i}])
b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).

70

Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rule with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j<i

Necessity constraint
The condition of the rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error and

target should evaluate to true. Formally, (rci ˅ Error(rci)) ˄ rti
iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be deny, and, in original policy, it will be N/A or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both of them will behave the same.
Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect after the ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RCT when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {(rci ˅ Error(rci)) ˄ rti } ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule
rj = < rbj, permit >for j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
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Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit
effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, the necessity constraint is that – rule condition

evaluates to N/A or error and rule target evaluates to true.
If policy target evaluates to an error, the necessity constraint is that – rule condition
evaluates to N/A and rule target evaluates to true.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule condition evaluates to false, then for all

other rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error and ith rule condition evaluates to false, then for
all other rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A.
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule condition evaluates to an error, then
explicit propagation constraint is not required such that reachability and necessity
constraint are enough for fault detection.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RCT when RCA is first-applicable.
({PT} ˄  rci ˄ rti ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj
such that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
(Error(PT)} ˄  rci ˄ rti ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule rj such that
rei = rej for j > i})
˅
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(PT ˄ Error(rci) ˄ rti ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i})
3.5

FDC for Rule Condition False (RCF)
Rule condition false is a mutation operator which alters the rule condition such that it

will always evaluate to false. One of the transformation rules to make condition always
evaluate to false is to introduce new constraint in condition with a random attribute which
will always be false. Since it has a fault in the condition of the rule, it is under the category
incorrect rule condition.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, …. ,ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri’, ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’, rci,
rei> such that P’ is similar to P except the condition rci’ of ith rule ri’ in P’ always evaluates
to false. Here, P’ is called the Rule Condition False (RCF) Mutant of P. The fault detection
condition for Rule Condition False based on RCA are given below.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should
not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule condition evaluates to true or error and rule

target evaluates to true. Formally, (rci ˅ Error(rci)) ˄ rti
iii)

Propagation constraint
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If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule effect
is deny, then all other rules should evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist
a pair of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is
permit rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or
error.
({PT)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule
effect is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules with permit effect should not evaluate to true. Further, there should not exist a pair
of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit
rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule effect
is permit, then all other permit rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT } ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny
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rules evaluate to N/A. However, if any deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another
permit effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd
˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
If policy target evaluates to true or error, ith rule condition evaluates to an error and ith
rule effect is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j != i}
If policy target evaluates to true or error, ith rule condition evaluates to an error and ith
rule effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i})
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RCF when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄
{( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp)
˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj =
<rbi, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i}˄ {( ∃(p,d)
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such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d (
rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rci)˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j != i}
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT))} ˄ Error(rci) ˄ rti ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj
= <rbj, permit> for j != i})
b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
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In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The target of the rule under consideration should evaluate to true and condition should

evaluate to true. Formally, rti ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be N/A and, in original policy, it will be true or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both will behave the same.
Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect evaluate to N/A or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RCF when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rti ˄ rci } ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule rj = < rbj, permit
>for j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint
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If policy target evaluates to true, the necessity constraint is that – rule condition
evaluates to N/A or error and rule target evaluates to true.
If policy target evaluates to an error, the necessity constraint is that – rule condition
evaluates to N/A and rule target evaluates to true.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule condition evaluates to true, then for all

other rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule condition evaluates to an error, then for all
other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to
N/A or true
If policy target evaluates to an error and ith rule condition evaluates to an error or true,
then for all other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should
evaluate to N/A.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RCF when RCA is first-applicable.
({PT} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj such
that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({PT} ˄ Error(rci)˄ rti ˄ {rbj ˅rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule rj such
that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({Error(PT) } ˄ (rci ˅Error(rci)) ˄ rti ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule
rj such that rei = rej for j > i})
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3.6

FDC for Add Not Function (ANF)
Add not function is a mutation operator which adds a not function to the rule condition

such that rule condition will always evaluate to false on faulty policy if it evaluates to true
in original policy, and vice versa. Since it has a fault in the condition of the rule, it is under
the category incorrect rule condition.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, …. ,ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri’, ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’, rci,
rei> such that P’ is similar to P except the condition rci’ of ith rule ri’ in P’ is rci. Here,
P’ is called the Add Not Function (ANF) Mutant of P. The fault detection condition for
ANF based on RCA are given below.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e.
should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for

ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule condition evaluates to true and rule target

evaluates to true. Formally, rci ˄ rti
Note: we do not consider the error case on condition because error case will produce no
different intermediate results between faulty and original policy

iii)

Propagation constraint

79

If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule effect
is deny, then all other rules should evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist
a pair of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is
permit rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or
error.
({PT)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule
effect is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules with permit effect should not evaluate to true. Further, there should not exist a pair
of the rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit
rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule effect
is permit, then all other permit rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT } ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule condition evaluates to true and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny
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rules evaluate to N/A. However, if any deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another
permit effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd
˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of ANF when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄
{( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp)
˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj =
<rbi, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i}˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d (
rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
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b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The target of the rule under consideration should evaluate to true and condition should

evaluate to true. Formally, rti ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be N/A, and, in original policy, it will be true or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both will behave the same.
Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect evaluate to N/A or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of ANF when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
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({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rti ˄ rci } ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule rj = < rbj, permit
>for j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule condition evaluates to N/A and rule target

evaluates to true.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule condition evaluates to true, then for all

other rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error and ith rule condition evaluates true, then for all
other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to
N/A.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of ANF when RCA is first-applicable.
({PT } ˄ rti ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj such
that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({Error(PT) } ˄ rci ˄ rti ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule
rj such that rei = rej for j > i})
3.7

FDC for Remove Not Function (RNF)
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Remove not function is a mutation operator which removes a not function from the
rule condition such that rule condition will always evaluate to false on faulty policy if it
evaluates to true in original policy, and vice versa. Since it has a fault in the condition of
the rule, it is under the category incorrect rule condition.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, …. ,ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri’, ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’, rci,
rei> such that P’ is similar to P except the condition rci’ of ith rule ri’ in P’ is rci. Here,
P’ is called the Remove Not Function (RNF) Mutant of P. The fault detection condition
for RNF is same as that for ANF because the effect of mutation operator on both cases is
rci’ = rci.
3.8

FDC for Remove a Rule (RER)
Remove a rule is a mutation operator which removes a rule from the policy such that

rule condition will always evaluate to false on faulty policy if it evaluates to true in original
policy, and vice versa. Since it has a fault in the condition of the rule, it is under the category
incorrect rule condition.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA, RL’> where
RL = <r1, …. ,ri, ..., rn>, RL’ = <r1, ..., ri-1, ri+1, , ..., rn>, ri = <rti, rci, rei> and ri‘ = <rti’,
rci, rei> such that P’ is similar to P except for that P’ does not contain ri in in rule list.
Here, P’ is called the Remove a Rule (RER) Mutant of P. The fault detection condition for
RER based on RCA are given below.
a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
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Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit
effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should
not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint is that – rule body evaluates to true or error. Formally, rbi ˅

Error(rbi)
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule body evaluates to true and ith rule effect is

deny, then all other rules should evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist a
pair of rules (excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit
rule which evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({PT)} ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule body evaluates to true and ith rule effect is
deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other rules with
permit effect should not evaluate to true. Further, there should not exist a pair of rules
(excluding the current rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit rule which
evaluates to an error and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
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that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, ith rule body evaluates to true and ith rule effect is
permit, then all other permit rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT } ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
If policy target evaluates to an error, ith rule body evaluates to true and ith rule effect is
permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny rules
evaluate to N/A. However, if any deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another permit
effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd
˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
If policy target evaluates to true or error, ith rule body evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is deny, then all other rules with deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other
rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rbi) ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j != i}
If policy target evaluates to true or error, ith rule body evaluates to an error and ith rule
effect is permit, then all other rules with permit effect should evaluate to N/A.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rbi) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i})
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Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RER when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT } ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d)
such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄
(Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i}˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
˅
({PT } ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ rbi ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd ˅
Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ Error(rbi) ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbj, deny> for j != i}
˅
({PT ˅ Error(PT))} ˄ Error(rbi) ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> for j != i})
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b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rule with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The rule should evaluate to true. Formally, rbi

iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be N/A and, in original policy, it will be true or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both will behave the same.
Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect evaluate to N/A or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RER when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
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({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbi} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule rj = < rbj, permit >for
j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, the necessity constraint is that – rule body evaluates

to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error, the necessity constraint is that – rule body
evaluates to N/A.
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule body evaluates to true, then for all other

rules which have the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule body evaluates to an error, then for all
other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate to
N/A or true
If policy target evaluates to an error and ith rule body evaluates to an error or true, then
for all other rules after the ith rule which has the same effect as that of ith rule should evaluate
to N/A.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RER when RCA is first-applicable.
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({PT} ˄ rbi ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj such that
rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({PT} ˄ Error(rbi) ˄ {rbj ˅rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule rj such that
rei = rej for j > i})
˅
({Error(PT) } ˄ (rbi ˅Error(rbi)) ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any rule rj
such that rei = rej for j > i})
3.9

FDC for Policy Target True (PTT)
Policy target true is a mutation operator which alters the policy target such that it will

always evaluate to true. One of the transformation rules to make target always evaluate to
true is to make it empty so that it will always evaluate to true. Since it has a fault in the
target of a policy, it is under the category incorrect policy target.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT’, RCA, RL’> where
PT and PT’ are such that P’ is similar to P except the target PT’ of P’ always evaluates to
true. Here, P’ is called the Policy Target True (PTT) Mutant of P. The fault detection
condition for Policy Target True based on RCA are given below.
a)

permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target is the first element to be evaluated in a policy element. Hence, it is

empty.
ii)

Necessity constraint
The policy target evaluates to N/A or error.
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iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to N/A, at least one rule should evaluate to true or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error, there should be one permit rule that evaluates to

true or all permit rules evaluate to N/A and at least one deny rule evaluates to true.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of PTT when RCA is permit-overrides:
(PT ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj }) ˅ (Error(PT) ˄ ( {rbj for any rule rj such that rj
= <rbj, permit>} ˅{rbj for all rule rj such that rj = <rbj, permit> ˄ rbj for any rule rj
such that rj = <rbj, deny> ))
b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target is the first element to be evaluated in a policy element. Hence, it is

empty.
ii)

Necessity constraint
The policy target evaluates to N/A or error.

iii)

Propagation constraint
Necessity constraint is sufficient for fault detection. Combining all constraints as a

single constraint, we get the following constraint for fault detection of PTT when RCA is
deny-unless-permit:  PT ˅ Error(PT)
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target is the first element to be evaluated in a policy element. Hence, it is

empty.
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ii)

Necessity constraint
The policy target evaluates to N/A or error.

iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, at least one rule should evaluate to true or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error, there should be one rule that evaluates to true and

all other rules before that rule should evaluate to N/A.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of PTT when RCA is first-applicable:
(PT ˄ {rbj ˅Error(rbj) for any rule rj }) ˅ (Error(PT) ˄ ( {rbj for any rule rj ˄  rbi for
any rule ri such that i < j }))
3.10

FDC for Policy Target False (PTF)
Policy target false is a mutation operator which alters the policy target such that it will

always evaluate to false. Since it has a fault in the target of a policy, it is under the category
incorrect policy target.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT’, RCA, RL’> where
PT and PT’ are such that P’ is similar to P except the target PT’ of P’ always evaluates to
false. Here, P’ is called the Policy Target False (PTF) Mutant of P. The fault detection
condition for Policy Target False based on RCA are given below.
a)

permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target is the first element to be evaluated in a policy element. Hence, it is

empty.
ii)

Necessity constraint
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The policy target evaluates to true or error.
iii)

Propagation constraint
At least one rule should evaluate to true or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for

fault detection of PTF when RCA is permit-overrides:
((PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ {rbj ˅Error(rbj) for any rule rj }
b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target is the first element to be evaluated in a policy element. Hence, it is

empty.
ii)

Necessity constraint
The policy target evaluates to true or error.

iii)

Propagation constraint
Necessity constraint is sufficient for fault detection. Combining all constraints as a

single constraint, we get the following constraint for fault detection of PTT when RCA is
permit-overrides: PT ˅ Error(PT)
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target is the first element to be evaluated in a policy element. Hence, it is

empty.
ii)

Necessity constraint
The policy target evaluates to true or error.

iii)

Propagation constraint
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At least one rule should evaluate to true or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of PTT when RCA is permit-overrides:
((PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ {rbj ˅Error(rbj) for any rule rj }
3.11

FDC for First Permit Rule (FPR)
First Permit Rule is a mutation operator which changes the position of the first Deny

rule with the first Permit rule that follows the first Deny rule. Since it has a fault with the
ordering of the rules, it is under the category incorrect rule ordering.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> where RL = <r1, …. ,rd… rp..rn>,
RL’ = <r1, ..., rp, … rd, ..., rn> such that P’ is similar to P except the order of first permit
rule following the first deny rule in P is swapped in P’.
Note: The order of permit rules and deny rules does not alter the decision of the policy
element if the RCA are Permit-Override, Deny Override, Permit-unless-Deny or Deny-unlessPermit
The order of permit rules and deny rules matters only when both or at least one pair of permit
rule and deny rule can be applied (true or error) at the same time. If they cannot be applied at the
same time, then such a mutant will be equivalent to the original policy.

The fault detection condition of FPR when RCA is first-applicable is as follows:
i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target evaluates to true or error.

ii)

Necessity constraint

The rule with first permit effect should evaluate to true or error and the rule with first
deny effect following the first permit rule should evaluate to true or error.
iii)

Propagation constraint
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Necessity constraint is sufficient for fault detection.
(rbp ˅ Error(rbp)) ˄ (rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) for the first permit rule rp = <rbp, permit> and
for the first deny rule rd = <rbd, deny> after rp.
3.12

FDC for First Deny Rule (FDR)
First Deny Rule is a mutation operator which changes the position of the first Permit

rule with the first Deny rule that follows the first Permit rule. Since it has a fault with the
ordering of the rules, it is under the category incorrect rule ordering.
Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> where RL = <r1, …. ,rd… rp..rn>,
RL’ = <r1, ..., rp, … rd, ..., rn> such that P’ is similar to P except the order of first deny rule
following the first permit rule in P is swapped in P’.
The fault detection condition of FDR when RCA is first-applicable is as follows:
i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target evaluates to true or error.

ii)

Necessity constraint
The rule with first deny effect should evaluate to true or error and the rule with first

permit effect following the first deny rule should evaluate to true or error.
iii)

Propagation constraint
Necessity constraint is sufficient for fault detection.

(rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rbp ˅ Error(rbp)) for the first deny rule rd = <rbd, deny> and for
the first permit rule rp = <rbp, permit> after rd.
3.13

FDC for Remove Parallel Target Element (RPTE)
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Remove Parallel Target Element is a mutation operator in which an AnyOf element of
the target or AllOf element of an AnyOf element is removed from the target. Since it has a
fault of missing a target element, it is under the category missing target element.
Let PT be the target element of Policy P of the rule ri. The target element is composed
of the conjunction of AnyOf element and each AnyOf element is composed of the
disjunction of AllOf elements. Hence PT = AnyOf1  AnyOf2  … AnyOfi  … AnyOfn and
arbitrary ith AnyOfi = AllOfi1 ˅ AllOfi2 ˅ AllOfij ˅ AllOfim. If either ith AnyOf is removed
or jth AllOf from ith AnyOf is removed, the resulted faulty policy is called Remove parallel
target element mutant. The fault detection condition for RPTE is presented as follows: a)

Permit-overrides:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should
not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint for RPTE with ith AnyOf element missing is that – rule target

expression should have negation term for ith AnyOf element and rule condition evaluates to
true.
Formally, (AnyOf1 ˄  AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˄ rci
The necessity constraint for RPTE with jth AllOf element of ith AnyOf element missing
is that – rule target expression should have a positive term for jth AllOf element of ith AnyOf
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element and all other AllOf element should have a negative term and rule condition
evaluates to true.
Formally, (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi =(AllOf1 ˅ AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true and ith rule effect is deny, then all other rules should

evaluate to N/A or error. Further, there should not exist a pair of rules (excluding the current
rule under consideration) such that one of them is permit rule which evaluates to an error
and other is deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({PT)} ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such
that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd)
˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to an error, and ith rule effect is deny, then all other rules with
deny effect should evaluate to N/A and all other rules with permit effect should not evaluate
to true. Further, there should not exist a pair of rules (excluding the current rule under
consideration) such that one of them is permit rule which evaluates to an error and other is
deny rule which evaluates to true or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi, permit>
for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j != i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such that (i
≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄ Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
If policy target evaluates to true, and ith rule effect is permit, then all other permit rules
should evaluate to N/A or error.
({PT } ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule rj = <rbi, permit>
for j != i})
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If policy target evaluates to an error, and ith rule effect is permit, then all other rules
with permit effect should evaluate to N/A if all deny rules evaluate to N/A. However, if any
deny rule evaluates to true or error, then another permit effect can evaluate to N/A or error.
({Error(PT)} ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j != i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd ˅
Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit rule rj = <rbi,
permit> for j != i }])
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTT when RCA is permit-overrides:
({PT } ˄ {(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1 ˅ AllOfj ˅

AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any rule rj for j
!= i} ˄ {( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄
Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({Error(PT)} ˄ {(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1 ˅
AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, deny> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any
permit rule rj = <rbi, permit> for j != i} ˄ {rbj for any deny rule rj = <rbi, deny> for j
!= i}˄ {( ∃(p,d) such that (i ≠ p ≠ d) ˄ (rd = < rbd, deny>) ˄ (rp = < rbp, permit>) ˄
Error(rbp) ˄ (Error(rbd) ˅ rbd))})
˅
({PT } ˄ {(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1 ˅ AllOfj ˅

AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit rule
rj = <rbi, permit> for j != i})
˅
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({Error(PT)} ˄ {(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1 ˅
AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)} ˄ rci ˄ ri = <rbi, permit> ˄ [{rbj for any rule rj for j
!= i} ˅ { ∃d ( rbd ˅ Error(rbd)) ˄ (rd = <rbd, deny>) ˄ (rbj ˅ Error(rbj )) for any permit
rule rj = <rbi, permit> for j != i }])
b)

deny-unless-permit:

i)

Reachability constraint
The policy target should be true or should evaluate to an error. For any permit rule rj

= <rbj, permit> (j<i) before rule ri, rbj should not evaluate to true (i.e it should be N/A or
evaluates to an error).
Hence, the reachability constraint is - policy target evaluates to true or error and all
the previous rules with permit effect before the current rule under consideration should
evaluate to N/A or error (i.e should not evaluate to true).
In formal notation, it will be {PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any permit
rule rj = <rbj, permit> for
ii)

j < i}

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint for RPTE with ith AnyOf element missing is that – rule target

expression should have negation term for ith AnyOf element and rule condition evaluates to
true.
Formally, (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˄ rci
The necessity constraint for RPTE with jth AllOf element of ith AnyOf element missing
is that – rule target expression should have a positive term for jth AllOf element of ith AnyOf
element and all other AllOf element should have a negative term and rule condition
evaluates to true.
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Formally, (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi =(AllOf1 ˅ AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If rule under consideration is deny rule, then the mutant is equivalent because the rule

level decision in mutant will be deny, and, in original policy, it will be N/A or error.
However, for deny-unless-permit RCA, anything other than permit effect results in deny
decision. And, it is only the current rule under consideration where mutant differs from
original policy and hence both of them will behave the same.
Hence, the rule under consideration should be permit rule such that all the rules with
permit effect after the ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTT when RCA is deny-unless-permit.
({PT ˅ Error(PT)} ˄ {({(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1
˅ AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)}) ˄ rci } ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbi) for any permit rule rj = <
rbj, permit >for j != i})
c)

first-applicable:

i)

Reachability constraint
Policy target should evaluate to true or error and all the previous rules with permit

effect before the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A.
ii)

Necessity constraint
The necessity constraint for RPTE with ith AnyOf element missing is that – rule target

expression should have negation term for ith AnyOf element and rule condition evaluates to
true.
Formally, (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˄ rci
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The necessity constraint for RPTE with jth AllOf element of ith AnyOf element missing
is that – rule target expression should have a positive term for jth AllOf element of ith AnyOf
element and all other AllOf element should have a negative term and rule condition
evaluates to true.
Formally, (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi =(AllOf1 ˅ AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˄ rci
iii)

Propagation constraint
If policy target evaluates to true, then for all other rules which have the same effect as

that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A or error.
If policy target evaluates to an error, then for all other rules which have the same effect
as that of ith rule should evaluate to N/A.
Combining all constraints as a single constraint, we get the following constraint for
fault detection of RTT when RCA is first-applicable.
({PT} ˄ ({(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1 ˅ AllOfj ˅

AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)}) ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj ˅ Error(rbj) for any
rule rj such that rei = rej for j > i})
˅
(Error(PT)} ˄ ({(AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi ˄ .. AnyOfn) ˅ (AnyOf1 ˄ AnyOfi = (AllOf1 ˅
AllOfj ˅ AllOfm) ˄ .. AnyOfn)}) ˄ rci ˄ {rbj for any rule rj for j < i} ˄ {rbj for any
rule rj such that rei = rej for j > i})
3.14

FDC for Change Rule Combining Algorithm (CRC)
Change Rule Combining Algorithm is a mutation operator in which the combining

algorithm of the policy is changed to another combining algorithm. Since it has a fault of
in combining algorithm, it is under the category incorrect combining algorithm.
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Consider an XACML policy P = <PT, RCA, RL> and P’ = <PT, RCA’, RL> such that
P’ is similar to P except the RCA’ in P’ is different from one in P. Here, P’ is called the
Change Combining Algorithm (CCA) Mutant of P. The fault detection condition for CRC
presented as follows.
a) FDC for change from permit-overrides to Deny-overrides:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
There should exist at least one pair of rules such that one of them is permit rule and
another is deny such that both evaluate to true or one evaluates to true and other evaluates
to an error.
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ (p,d) such that rp = <rbp, permit> ˄ rd = <rbd, deny> ˄ ({rbp ˄
rbd} ˅ {Error(rbp) ˄ rbd} ˅ {Error(rbd) ˄ rbp})
Note: if all of the permit rules are N/A while one or more deny rules evaluate to true or
error and if all of the deny rules are N/A while one or more permit rules evaluate to true or error,
permit-overrides and deny-overrides behaves the same.

b) FDC for change from permit-overrides to deny-unless-permit:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
˄
(All of the rules evaluate to N/A
˅
one or more permit rules evaluates to an error
˅
one or more deny rules evaluates to an error and the rest are N/A and PT evaluates to true)
Formally,
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(PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ ({rbj for all rules in P} ˅ {Error(rbj ) for any permit rule rj = <rbj,
permit> in P} ˅{PT ˄ Error(rbk ) for some deny rule rk = <rbk, deny> in P ˄  rbj for
other rules rj in P such that k j})
c) FDC for change from permit-overrides to permit-unless-deny:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
˄
(All of the rules evaluate to N/A
˅
one or more permit rule evaluates to true only if one or more deny rules evaluate to true.
˅
one or more deny rule evaluates to true only if one or more permit rule evaluates to true or
error
˅
one or more permit rule evaluates to an error and the rest evaluates to N/A and PT evaluates
to true.)
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ ({rbj for all rules in P} ˅ { rbd ˄ (rbp ˅ Error(rbp )) for any permit
rule rp = <rbp, permit> and for any deny rule rd = <rbd, deny> in P} ˅{PT ˄ Error(rbk )
for some permit rule rk = <rbk, permit> in P ˄  rbj for other rules rj in P such that k
j})
d) FDC for change from permit-overrides to first-applicable:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
˄

103

if rf is the first rule that evaluates to true, then rf is deny rule and there exists one or more
permit rule that evaluates to true or error
˅
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is deny rule, then there exists one or
more permit or deny rule that evaluates to true or one or more permit rule that evaluates to
an error
˅
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is permit rule, then there exists one or
more permit or deny rule that evaluates to true or one or more deny rule that evaluates to
an error)
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT))
˄
({(rbj ˄ rbf for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, deny> ˄ rbp for some permit rule rp
= <rbp, permit>)}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, deny>) ˄ (rbi for some permit
or deny rule ˅ Error(rbp) for some permit rule rbp) ))}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, permit>) ˄ (rbi for some permit
or deny rule ˅ Error(rbd) for some deny rule rbd))})
e) FDC for change from deny-overrides to permit-unless-deny:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
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˄
(All of the rules evaluate to N/A
˅
one or more deny rule evaluates to an error
˅
one or more permit rule evaluates to an error and rest are N/A and PT evaluates to true)
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ ({rbj for all rules in P} ˅ {Error(rbj ) for any deny rule rj = <rbj,
deny> in P} ˅{PT ˄ Error(rbk ) for some permit rule rk = <rbk, permit> in P ˄  rbj for
other rules rj in P such that k j})
f) FDC for change from deny-overrides to deny-unless-permit:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
˄
(All of the rules evaluate to N/A
˅
one or more deny rule evaluates to true only if one or more permit rules evaluate to true.
˅
one or more permit rule evaluates to true only if one or more deny rule evaluates to true or
error
˅
one or more deny rule evaluates to an error and rest evaluates to N/A and PT evaluates to
true.)
Formally,
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(PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ ({rbj for all rules in P} ˅ { rbp ˄ (rbd ˅ Error(rbd )) for any permit
rule rp = <rbp, permit> and for any deny rule rd = <rbd, deny> in P} ˅{PT ˄ Error(rbk )
for some deny rule rk = <rbk, deny> in P ˄  rbj for other rules rj in P such that k j})
g) FDC for change from deny-overrides to first-applicable:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
˄
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to true, then rf is permit rule and there exists one or more
deny rule that evaluates to true or error
˅
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is permit rule, then there exists one or
more permit or deny rule that evaluates to true or one or more deny rule that evaluates to
an error
˅
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is deny rule, then there exists one or
more permit or deny rule that evaluates to true or one or more permit rule that evaluates to
an error
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT))
˄
({(rbj ˄ rbf for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, permit> ˄ rbd for some deny rule rd
= <rbd, deny>)}
˅
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{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, permit>) ˄ (rbi for some permit
or deny rule ˅ Error(rbd) for some deny rule rbd) ))}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, deny>) ˄ (rbi for some deny or
permit rule ˅ Error(rbp) for some permit rule rbp))})
h) FDC for change from permit-unless-deny to deny-unless-permit:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error.
˄
(All of the rules evaluate to N/A or error
˅
if one rule evaluates to true, then other rules with opposite effect must evaluate to true.)
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT)) ˄ ({rbj ˅Error(rbj) for all rules in P} ˅ { rbp ˄ rbd for any permit rule
rp = <rbp, permit> and for any deny rule rd = <rbd, deny> in P})
i) FDC for change from permit-unless-deny to first-applicable:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error
˄
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to true, then rf is permit rule and there exists one or more
deny rule that evaluates to true.
˅
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is permit rule, then policy target should
evaluate to true or one or more deny rule should evaluate to true.
˅
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if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is deny rule, then policy target should
evaluate to true if one or more deny rule evaluates to true.)
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT))
˄
({(rbj ˄ rbf for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, permit> ˄ rbd for some deny rule rd
= <rbd, deny>)}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf ) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, permit> ˄ (rbd for some deny
rule rd = <rbd, deny>) ˅ PT)}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf ) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, deny> ˄ ( (rbd for some deny
rule rd = <rbd, deny>)) ˅ PT)})
j) FDC for change from deny-unless-permit to first-applicable:
Policy target should evaluate to true or error
˄
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to true, then rf is deny rule and there exists one or more
permit rule that evaluates to true.
˅
if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is deny rule, then policy target should
evaluate to true or one or more permit rule should evaluate to true.
˅
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if rf is the first rule that evaluates to an error and rf is permit rule, then policy target should
evaluate to true if one or more permit rule evaluates to true.)
Formally,
(PT ˅Error(PT))
˄
({(rbj ˄ rbf for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, deny> ˄ rbp for some permit rule rp
= <rbp, permit>)}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf ) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, deny> ˄ (rbp for some permit
rule rp = <rbp, permit>) ˅ PT)}
˅
{(rbj ˄ Error(rbf ) for some f such that j <f) ˄ (rf = <rbf, permit> ˄ ( (rbp for some
permit rule rp = <rbp, permit>)) ˅ PT)})
Note: FDC for CRC from permit-overrides to deny-overrides is applicable from denyoverrides to permit-overrides as well. Hence, we have all possible combinations between five
RCAs.
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CHAPTER 4

Mutation-Based Test Generation
Mutation-based test generation involves generating test suites exploiting the fault
detection condition with the goal to kill all the non-equivalent mutants. The formalization
of complete fault detection conditions makes it feasible to automatically perform strong
mutation-based test generation. From fault detection condition, we know that if any request
satisfies reachability, necessity and propagation for a fault, it will produce a different result
in original policy, and faulty policy. This difference in response can be exploited to
distinguish faulty policy from the correct policy. Hence, the goal is to generate test input
that satisfies the three constraints of the fault detection condition - reachability, necessity
and sufficiency/propagation for each possible fault policy.
FDC may include multiple mutually exclusive conditions. If one of them is satisfied,
it will be sufficient for the fault detection. As a result, we just use one of the mutually
exclusive conditions for each fault. In other words, we do not need to generate multiple
requests for each of the mutually exclusive conditions because it will just generate
redundant test cases. The process of identifying such sufficient mutually exclusive
conditions (if any exist) to detect a fault is discussed in Section 1.3.2. The overall process
for strong mutation-based (SMT) test generation is depicted in Algorithm 1.
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4.1

Strong Mutation-Based Test Generation

Algorithm 1: Mutation-based generation of the near-optimal test suite (SMT)
Import functions: kill(M, Q) returns the list of mutants in M that are killed by test suite Q
Z3-request(FDC) returns a solution to the constraint FDC
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>, Ω is a list of mutation operators
Output: A set of access requests Q
Variables: M is a mutant pool, OPS is a list of mutation operators, FDC is a fault
detection condition, q is a test input
1

Q є

2

While Ω  

3

OPS  select one or more mutation operators from Ω

4

M  list of mutants created by mutation operators OPS

5

M  M – kill(M, Q)

6

While M  

7

FDC  compose the fault detection conditions of one or more mutants

8

q  Z3-request(FDC)

9

If (q is not null) // otherwise equivalent mutant

10

Q  Q  {q}

11

M  M – kill(M, {q})

12

EndIf

13

EndWhile

14

EndWhile

15

Return Q
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From formalization of the fault detection condition, we have identified RTF, RCF,
ANF, RNF, and RER have common fault detection conditions among various possible
mutually exclusive fault detection conditions for each of them. Algorithm 6 in Section 4.3
presents such common fault detection conditions among them. As a result, we do not need
to deal with each of those mutation operators individually. In other words, if we generate
a request that satisfies that common fault detection condition among them, it can kill the
mutants from RTF, RCF, ANF, RNF and RER. So, we select one (or more mutation
operators if they have common FDC ) at a time and generate mutants for them (line 3-4),
and run the mutants against the existing tests. The mutants that are already killed by the
existing tests are removed from the mutant pool (line 5). Then we compose the constraint
for one or more compatible mutants (line 7) and then solve the constraint by using the Z3
constraint solver [17] (line 8) If the constraint is solved, we convert the solution into an
access request and add it to the test suite (lines 9-10), otherwise, the mutant is considered
an equivalent mutant. We also run the new test against the current mutant pool. Mutants
killed by the new test will be removed from the pool (line 11). When all mutation operators
are handled, we return Q as the generated test suite.
Algorithm 1 is computationally expensive for the policy with a large number of the
rules because of the involved optimization (step 4, 5 and 11) which needs to generate
mutants and determine whether they are killed or not. These optimization steps are costly
because kill(M,Q) is in the order of O(n3) where n is the number of the rule in a policy.
Executing a test with each mutant has a complexity of O(n). The number of mutants is in
linear order and test suite size is linear as well. Hence, kill(M,Q) is in the order of O(n3)
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because in the worst case we need to run an operation with the complexity of O(n) for
mutants of the size O(n) for each request in test suite of the size O(n).
As a result, if n grows very large in big policies, the optimization steps grows in the
cubic order which makes it unfeasible to use for large policies. So, we also formulated the
mutation-based test generation without optimization which we referred to as NonOptimized Strong Mutation-based Testing (NO-SMT) which generates a test suite that
achieves a 100% mutant score like SMT. NO-SMT is nothing but the Algorithm 1 itself
excluding the steps 4,5 and 11. However, it will have many redundant test cases than that
from SMT. Hence, it is the trade-off between test generation time against test suite size.
We have implemented these algorithms as an extension to the open source XPA tool.
The complexity of step 7 (for a single iteration) i.e generation of FDC constraint will
be in the order of O(n). The details on FDC constraint generation for each mutation operator
is presented in Section 4.1 through Section 4.14. The time complexity of step 8 (for single
iteration) is the time complexity of Z3 for solving FDC constraint expression. Let, O(Z3)
represents the time complexity of Z3 at step 8. kill(M, {q}) in step 11 will be in the order
of O(n2) since it is similar to kill(M,Q) but for a single test q. Since the size of M will be in
linear order, the time complexity of step 6 through step 13 will be in the order of O(n.(
O(Z3)+ n2)). Similarly, the time complexity of NO-SMT will be in the order of O(n.(O(Z3)
+ n) ).
As demonstrated in the empirical study, the test generation time of SMT grows much
faster than RC, DC, and MC/DC. It is worth pointing out that, in this paper, the mutationbased generation of the near-optimal test suite is not meant to be a practical test generation
method for large-scale XACML policies. Instead, our goal is to use the test suite as a
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benchmark for measuring relative cost-effectiveness of other testing methods. In addition,
the mutation-based test suite can be used to help improve other testing methods by
determining equivalent mutants and investigating fault detection conditions of live
mutants. However, coverage-based test generation does not guarantee 100% mutation
score and if 100% mutation score is desired irrespective of the size of a test suite, then we
can use NO-SMT for the larger policies as well.
The following are algorithms used to construct fault detection condition for each
possible mutant for each mutation operator in the fault model.
4.1.1

FDC Constraint and Tests Generation for CRE

Algorithm 2: generateTestsForCRE(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

constraint  PT

3

For each Rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rn] in P, do

4

ruleConstraint  constraint

5

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  ruleReachability(P, ri)

6

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  rti  rci

7

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  rulePropagation(P,ri,CRE)

8

Q  Q U Z3-request(ruleConstraint)

9

EndFor

10

return Q
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The input to the algorithm is policy P = < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]> and output is
set of generated access request Q. Initially we set Q to be empty (line 1). We then set the
constraint expression from policy target if it is present, otherwise, the constraint is empty
(line 4). The next step is to iterate over each rule in the policy (line 3) and construct fault
detection condition constraint to kill the mutant. For each rule, the rule constraint is set to
constraint expression (line 4) from policy target constraint in line 2. Then, for each rule in
the policy, the rule constraint expression is concatenated with reachability constraint (line
5). Once the reachability constraint is met, the next task is to concatenate the rule constraint
with necessity constraint for the fault type (line 6) and then concatenate the propagation
constraint (line 7). The constructed rule constraint is the constraint with sufficient
constraint to kill the CRE mutant and is supplied to the constraint solver (line 8) to obtain
the value for the test inputs. When all the rules are processed, the generated set of test input
- Q is returned. The algorithm for rule reachability is presented in Algorithm 3 in Section
4.1.1 and that for rule propagation is presented in Algorithm 4 in Section 4.1.2. It should
be noted that reachability and propagation constraint is constructed taking common
mutually exclusive conditions for reachability and propagation constraint for RTT, RTF,
RCT, RCF, ANF, RNF and RER such that it works for all of them. CRE has slightly
different propagation constraint than others but still shares the common constraints among
them. Hence, rather than defining redundant propagation constraint for CRE only, we used
the same method for propagation constraint passing the mutation method itself as an
argument to tweak the propagation constraint based on the mutation operator.
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4.1.2

FDC Constraint for Rule Reachability

Algorithm 3: ruleReachability(P, ri)
Import functions: hasCommonAttribute(rbi, rbj)  returns true if rule body of ith rule and
rule body of jth rule has a common attribute
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]> , Rule ri= <rti, rci, rei>
Output: constraint
1

constraint  є

2

If RCA = First-Applicable, then
For each rule rk in [r1, r2,…, ri-1] in P, do

3

constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

4
5
6
7
8

endFor
else
if RCA = Permit-unless-Deny, then
for each rule rk in [r1, r2,…, ri-1] in P, do

9

if rek = Deny, then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

10
11
12
13
14
15

endIF
endFor
else if RCA = Deny-unless-Permit, then
for each rule rk in [r1, r2,…, ri-1] in P, do
if rek = Permit, then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

16
17

endIf
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18

endFor

19

else if RCA = Deny-overrides, then
for each rule rk in [r1, r2,…, ri-1] in P, do

20
21

if rek = Deny, then

22

if hasCommonAttributes(rbi,rbk), then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

24
25

else

26

dominantRuleCollection.add(rk)

27

endIf

28

endIf

29

endFor

30

else if RCA = Permit-overrides, then
for each rule rk in [r1, r2,…, ri-1] in P, do

31
32

if rek = Permit, then

33

if hasCommonAttributes(rbi,rbk), then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

34
35

else

36

dominantRuleCollection.add(rk)

37

endIf

38

endIf

39

endFor

40
41

endIf
endIf
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4.2

Return Constraint
If rule combining algorithm is first-applicable, then all the previous rules before the

current rule under consideration i.e. ith rule should evaluate to N/A (line 2-5) otherwise if
RCA is permit-unless-deny, then all the previous rules with deny effect should be N/A (line
7-12). If RCA is deny-unless-permit, all the previous rules with permit effect should be
N/A (line 13-18). If RCA is deny-overrides (or permit-overrides), then we only falsify deny
(or permit) rules with common attributes in rule body of current rule under consideration
and mark the deny (or permit) rules with no common attribute for later to be used for
propagation constraint (line 19-29 and line 30-41).
4.3

FDC Constraint for Propagation

Algorithm 4: rulePropagation(P,ri,mutationMethod)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]> , Rule ri= <rti, rci, rei>
Output: constraint
1

constraint  є

2

If RCA = First-Applicable, then
for each rule rk in [ri+1, ri+2,…, rn] in P, do

3
4

if rek = rei, then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

5
6

endIf

7
8
9
10

endFor
else
if RCA = Permit-unless-Deny, then
for each rule rk in [ri+1, ri+2,…, rn] in P, do
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11

if rek = Deny, then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

12
13
14
15
16

endIf
endFor
else if RCA = Deny-unless-Permit, then
for each rule rk in [ri+1, ri+2,…, rn] in P, do

17

if rek = Permit, then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

18
19
20
21
22

endIf
endIf
else if RCA = Deny-overrides, then
for each rule rk in [ri+1, ri+2,…, rn] in P, do

23

if rek = Deny, then

24

if hasCommonAttributes(rbi,rbk), then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

25
26

else

27

dominantRuleCollection.add(rk)

28

endIf

29

endIf

30

endFor

31

if rei = permit and mutationMethod  CRE then

32
33

for each rule rl in dominantRuleCollection, do
if  (rtl  rcl)  (rtp  rcp) for rp = <rbp, permit>, then
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dominantIndeterminateFlag  true

34
35

else
constraint  constraint   (rtl  rcl)

36
37

endIf

38

endFor

39
40

if dominantIndeterminateFlag = true, then

41

permit-rules  get permit rules of P

42

for each rp in permit-rules, do
constraint  constraint  (rtp  rcp)

43
44

endFor

45
46
47
48

endIf
endIf
else if RCA = permit-overrides , then
for each rule rk in [ri+1, ri+2,…, rn] in P, do

49

if rek = permit, then

50

if hasCommonAttributes(rbi,rbk), then
constraint  constraint   (rtk  rck)

51
52

else

53

dominantRuleCollection.add(rk)

54

endIf

55
56

endIf
endFor
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if rei = deny and mutationMethod  CRE then

57
58

for each rule rl in dominantRuleCollection, do
if  (rtl  rcl)  (rtp  rcp) for rp = <rbp, permit>, then

59

dominantIndeterminateFlag  true

60
61

else
constraint  constraint   (rtl  rcl)

62
63

endIf

64

endFor

65

if dominantIndeterminateFlag = true, then

66

deny-rules  get deny rules of P

67

for each rd in deny-rules, do
constraint  constraint  (rtd  rcd)

68
69

endFor

70

endIf

71

endIf

72

endIf

73

endIf

74

return constraint
If RCA is first-applicable, then all the rules after current rule under consideration with

the same effect as that of the current rule under consideration should evaluate to N/A. If
RCA is permit-unless-deny, then all the rules after ith rule with deny effect should be N/A.
If RCA is deny-unless-permit, all the rules after ith rule with permit effect should be N/A.
If RCA is deny-overrides (or permit-overrides), then we only falsify deny (or permit) rules
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with common attributes in rule body of current rule under consideration and mark the deny
(or permit) rules with no common attribute for later to be used for propagation constraint.
If ith rule is deny (or permit), then propagation constraint is satisfied, and we can return the
constraint otherwise if it is permit (or deny) and mutation operator is not CRE (for CRE
the later propagation constraint i.e step 31- 46 is not required) and dominantRuleCollection
is not empty, we need to check for each rule in dominantRuleCollection whether falsifying
this deny (or permit) rule will fire another permit (or deny) rule. If this is the case, we
cannot falsify the current rule in dominantRuleCollection. Hence, we make it evaluate
indeterminate and set dominantIndeterminateFlag to true. If any deny (or permit) rule
evaluate to indeterminate, then for fault detection, all the permit(deny) rules should
evaluate to N/A.
4.4

FDC Constraint and Tests Generation for RTT

Algorithm 5: generateTestsForRTT(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

dominantIndeterminateFlag  false

3

dominantRuleCollection  null

4

constraint  PT

5

For each Rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rn] in P, do

6

ruleConstraint  constraint

7

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  ruleReachability(P, ri)

8

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint   rti  (rci ˅ Error(rci))
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9

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  rulePropagation(P,ri,RTT)

10

Q  Q U Z3-request(ruleConstraint)

11

EndFor

12

return Q
Like CRE, we construct the FDC to kill the RTT by combining reachability, necessity

and propagation constraint. The necessity constraint for RTT is that target of the rule under
consideration should be N/A and rule condition should be true.
4.5

FDC constraint and tests generation for RTF

Algorithm 6: generateTestsForRTF(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

dominantIndeterminateFlag  false

3

dominantRuleCollection  null

4

constraint  PT

5

For each Rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rn] in P, do

6

ruleConstraint  constraint

7

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  ruleReachability(P, ri)

8

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  (rti  rci) ˅ Error(rbi)

9

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  rulePropagation(P,ri,RTF)

10

Q  Q U Z3-request(ruleConstraint)

11

EndFor

12

return Q
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The input to the algorithm is policy P = < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]> and output is set of
generated access request Q. Initially we set Q to be empty (line 1). We set the
dominantIndeterminateFlag to false and dominantRuleCollection to null to keep track of
whether any dominant rule evaluated to indeterminate or not. If RCA is first-applicable,
then any rule is dominant. If RCA is permit-overrides or deny-unless-permit, then the rules
with permit effect will be the dominant rule. Similarly, rules with deny effect will be
dominant in policy with deny-overrides or permit-unless-deny RCA. We then set the
constraint expression from policy target if it is present, otherwise, the constraint is empty
(line 4). The next step is to iterate over each rule in the policy (line 5) and construct
sufficient condition constraint to kill the mutant. For each rule, the rule constraint is set to
constraint expression (line 6) from policy target constraint in line 2. Then, for each rule in
the policy, the rule constraint expression is concatenated with reachability constraint (line
7). Once the reachability constraint is met, the next task is to concatenate the rule constraint
with necessity constraint for the fault type (line 8) and then concatenate the propagation
constraint (line 9). The constructed rule constraint is the constraint with sufficient condition
to kill the RTF mutant which is supplied to constraint solver (line 10) to obtain the value
for the test inputs. When all the rules are processed, the generated set of test input - Q is
returned.
4.6

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for RCT

Algorithm 7: generateTestsForRCT(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є
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2

constraint  PT

3

For each Rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rn] in P, do

4

ruleConstraint  є

5

ruleConstraint  constraint  ruleReachability(P,ri)

5

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  (rti ˅ Error(rti))   rci

6

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  rulePropagation(P, ri, RCT)

7

Q  Q U Z3-request(ruleConstraint)

8

endFor

9

return Q
The sufficient condition to kill the RCT mutants is same as that for CRE except for

that condition of the rule under consideration should be N/A.
4.7

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for RCF
RCF and RTF have common sufficient condition for fault detection. Hence, Algorithm

6 for RTF is enough, and we don’t need to consider RCF if RTF is in the fault model.
4.8

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for ANF
RCF and RTF have common sufficient condition for fault detection. Hence, Algorithm

6 for CRE is enough and we don’t need to consider ANF if CRE is in the fault model.
4.9

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for RNF
RNF and RTF have similar sufficient condition to kill them. Hence, the constraint for

RTF is enough and we don’t need to consider RNF if RTF is in the fault model.
4.10

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for RER
RER and RTF have similar sufficient condition to kill them. Hence, the constraint for

RTF is enough and we don’t need to consider RER if RTF is in the fault model.
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4.11

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for PTT

Algorithm 10: generateTestsForPTT(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2, …, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

constraint   PT  (rt1  rc1)

3

Q  Q U Z3-request(constraint)

4

Return Q
The sufficient condition to kill PTT mutant is to make policy target evaluate to N/A

and make any rule’s (say the first rule) target and condition evaluate to true.
4.12

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for PTF

Algorithm 11: generateTestsForPTF(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2, …, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

constraint  PT  (rt1  rc1)

3

Q  Q U Z3-request(constraint)

4

Return Q

The sufficient condition to kill PTF mutant is to make policy target evaluate to true
and make any rule’s (say the first rule) target and condition evaluate to true.
4.13

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for FPR

Algorithm 8: generateTestsForFPR(P)
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Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2 ,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

constraint  PT

3

d  find the position of first Deny Rule

4

p  find first Permit Rule after d

5

if such p and d does not exist

6

return

7

constraint  rtd  rcd

8

constraint  rtp  rcp

9

if RCA = first-applicable

10

For each rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rd-1] in P, do
constraint  constraint   (rti  rci)

11
12
13

Q  Q U Z3-request(constraint)
return Q
The FPR mutants behave similarly to the original policy if RCA is other than first-

applicable. Even for the first applicable, if there does not exist a pair of rules such that one
is deny and other is permit, then the FPR mutant behaves the same as original policy.
Hence, the sufficient condition to kill non-equivalent FPR mutant is to make target and
condition of a pair of rules evaluate to true such that one of them is permit rule and the
other is deny rule.
4.14

FDC constraint and test generation for FDR

Algorithm 9: generateTestsForFDR(P)
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Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

constraint  PT

3

p  find the position of first permit Rule

4

d  find first deny Rule after p

5

if such p and d does not exist

6

return

7

constraint  rtd  rcd

8

constraint  rtp  rcp

9

if RCA = first-applicable
For each rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rd-1] in P, do

10

constraint  constraint   (rti  rci)

11

Q  Q U Z3-request(constraint)

12
13 return Q

The FDR mutants behave similarly to the original policy if RCA is other than firstapplicable. Even for the first applicable, if there does not exist a pair of rules such that one
is deny and other is permit, then the FDR mutant behaves the same as original policy.
Hence, the sufficient condition to kill non-equivalent FDR mutant is to make target and
condition of a pair of the rules evaluate to true such that one of them is permit rule and the
other is deny rule.
4.15

FDC Constraint and Test Generation for RPTE

Algorithm 12: generateTestsForRPTE(P)
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Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

constraint  PT

3

For each Rule ri in [r1, r2,…, rn] in P, do

4

ruleConstraint  є

5

ruleConstraint  constraint  ruleReachability(P,ri)

6

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  ( rci ˅Error(rci))

7

ruleConstraint  ruleConstraint  rulePropagation(P,ri)

8

For each AnyOfj in [AnyOfi1, AnyOfij ,…, AnyOfim] in rti, do

9

anyConstraint  ruleConstraint  AnyOfi1   AnyOfij  AnyOfin

10

Q  Q U Z3-request(anyConstraint)

11

For each AllOfk in [AllOfij1, AllOfijk ,…, AllOfijl] in rti, do
allConstraint  ruleConstraint  AnyOfi1  (AllOfij1V AllOfijk

12

,…˅  AllOfijl)  AnyOfin
Q  Q U Z3-request(anyConstraint)

13
14

return Q

If there are m AnyOf clauses, then there should be m+1 expression such that one makes
all of them true and the rest makes each of them evaluate to false while the other evaluates
to true. In addition, for each AnyOf clause, if there are n AllOf clauses, then there should
be n+1 expression such that one makes all of them evaluate to false and the rest makes each
of them evaluate to true while others evaluate to false.
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4.16

FDC constraint and test generation for CRC

Algorithm 13: generateTestsForCCA(P)
Input: Policy P= < PT, RCA, [r1, r2,…, rn]>
Output: A set of access requests Q
1

Q є

2

Constraint1  PT

3

Constraint2  PT

4

p  find the position of permit Rule and deny Rule such that at least one of them
evaluates to true and other evaluates to true or error

5

d  find first deny Rule after p

6

if such p and d does not exist

7

go to step 11

8

Constraint1  Constraint1  rtd  rcd

9

Constraint1  Constraint1  Error(rtp  rcp)

10

Q  Q U Z3-request(Constraint1)

11

Constraint2  Constraint2  Error for all the rules [r1 … rn]

12

Q  Q U Z3-request(Constraint2)

13

Return Q
The sufficient condition to kill CCA mutants is to make target and condition of a pair

of the rules evaluate to true such that one of them is permit rule and other is deny rule. In
addition, all the rules that can be made evaluated to an error should be evaluated to an error.
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CHAPTER 5

Quantitative Analysis
This section presents our experiment that aims to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the
afore-mentioned testing methods by comparing them to SMT. As mutation score is
commonly used as the main indicator of effectiveness for a testing method, we measure
cost-effectiveness by comparing mutation score with test suite size i.e how many mutants
are killed given the test suite size. Further, the test suite size reflects the average time of
test execution. We will also discuss test generation time to reflect the run-time efficiency
of testing methods.
5.1

Experiment Setup
The mutation-based test generation and all coverage-based test generation methods

discussed in this work are implemented in open source tool - XPA (XACML Policy
Analyzer) [15] which is based on Balana [13] - an open source implementation of XACML
3.0. Our experiment was performed on a 64bit Ubuntu laptop with 8th Generation Intel®
Core™ i7-8550U Processor (1.80GHz 8MB) and 16.0GB DDR4 2400MHz. The
experiments use various XACML 3.0 policies with different levels of complexity as shown
in Table 5.1. K-Market is the sample policy from the Balana [13]. Sample, Sample-fa, and
Sample-dup policies are created by us for this research to cover the language feature of
XACML policies not covered by other policies in the literature. All other policies are from
the literature. iTrust-X and fedora-rule3-X are synthesized from iTrust and fedora policies
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respectively to study behavior in larger sized policies. The number of the rules ranges from
3 to 1,280 as depicted in Table 5.1 where ‘#’ represents ‘number of’ i.e. ‘#Rules’ means
‘number of the rules’ and LOC represents the line of code (markup) in the corresponding
policies.
The experiment involves generating mutants of each policy by using the mutation
operators in Table 3.1. Each mutation operator may generate several mutants for a given
policy. For example, given a policy with n rules, CRE (Change Rule Effect) creates n
mutants because it creates a mutant by changing the effect of each rule. The mutation
operators in Table 3.1 is based on the operators in the mutant generator, XACMUT [4].
The next activity is to identify the number of equivalent mutants and non-equivalent
mutants. As we applied strong mutation to generate SMT test suite, the number of mutants
killed from the strong mutation-based test suite (SMT) are non-equivalent mutants while
live mutants are equivalent mutants. Hence, we generate SMT test suite and run against the
mutants to identify the equivalent and non-equivalent mutants. As a result, the analysis
excludes mutants that are equivalent to their original policy. For example, the rule
combining algorithms permit-overrides and deny-overrides make no difference with
respect to a policy with permit-only (or deny-only) rules. Hence, a policy which only has
permit rules and its RCA changed from permit-overrides to deny-overrides are equivalent.
Our prior work on the formalization of semantic differences between combining algorithms
[26] provides descriptions about the conditions under which two combining algorithms are
equivalent. Table 5.1 lists the number of mutants for each subject policy.
As a next step, we generate test suites for each of the coverage-based test generation
methods for each of the subject policies and run that test suite against each policy and
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record the actual response of each test. We know each recorded response for each request
(test case) is the correct response from the policy for this test case. Hence, it can be used
as the Oracle value of this test case when the mutants are tested later. Finally, we run the
test suite of each test generation method against mutants. Since mutants represent the faults
that are likely to occur in XACML policies, mutation score is considered the indicator of
the fault-detection capability, as commonly used by the software testing community [16].
Table 5.1:

Policies used for the experiment

No

Subject Policy

LOC

#Rules

#Equivalent
Mutants

#Nonequivalent
Mutants

1

Conference [21]

228

15

1

91

2

fedora-rule31

226

12

1

87

3

K-Market-blue

84

4

1

27

58

3

1

21

106

5

1

32

[13]
4

K-Market-sliver
[13]

5

K-Market-gold
[13]

6

Sample

152

6

1

55

7

Sample-fa

114

4

0

42

8

Sample-dup

80

4

1

33

1

http://www.fedora.info
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9

fedora-rule3-2

588

32

1

207

10

fedora-rule3-3

2748

212

1

927

11

iTrust2

1282

64

4

450

12

iTrust-5 [15]

6402

320

4

2242

13

iTrust-10 [15]

12806 640

4

4482

14

iTrust-20 [15]

25602 1280

4

8962

The following section presents the results of the conducted experiment.
5.2

Results
5.2.1

Test Suite Size and Test Generation Time

Table 5.2 presents the number of tests generated for each subject policy for each testing
method. Typically, the test suite for NO-SMT has more tests. The test suite size of MC/DC
and SMT are nearly the same however SMT test suite is not larger than MC/DC test suite
for all the subject policies. The size of each RC test suite is the number of the rule in the
policy and it is always the smallest. The difference in test suite size between NE-DC and
DC as well as NE-MC/DC and MC/DC represents the error tests. Hence, there are only a
few error tests. For fedora with 12 rules has six error tests, while that of iTrust3-5 has only
one error tests for the policy with 320 rules. The reason is that most of the rules in the
iTrustX policy are defined over the same set of attributes - when a test makes one rule
evaluate to indeterminate, it will do the same for all other similar rules. As mentioned
before, SMT is computationally costly because of the involved optimization. It took SMT

2

http://agile.csc.ncsu.edu/iTrust/wiki/doku.php?id=start
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36.02 hours (129655675 ms in Table 5.3) to complete the test generation for iTrust3-10.
The estimated SMT test generation time for iTrust3-20 is nearly 10 days. As a result, we
decided not to run SMT for iTrust-20. However, from NO-SMT, we know that for each
mutant, there is at least one test that kills it.

Table 5.2:

Number of tests generated

Subject Policy

RC

NE-DC

DC

NE-

MC/DC

SMT

MC/DC

NOSMT

coference3

15

15

16

24

25

25

78

fedora-rule3

12

19

25

24

30

23

62

kMarket-blue-policy

4

7

10

8

11

7

21

kMarket-gold-policy

3

6

9

6

9

5

16

kMarket-sliver-policy

5

9

13

9

13

8

23

sample

6

13

19

15

21

16

51

sample-fa

4

9

15

10

16

11

30

sample-dup

4

7

10

9

12

8

23

fedora-rule3-2

32

39

45

64

70

62

162

fedora-rule3-3

212

219

225

244

250

242

702

iTrust3

64

65

66

196

197

196

387

135

iTrust3-5

320

321

322

982

983

982

1923

iTrust3-10

640

641

642

1964

1965

1964

3843

iTrust3-20

1280

1281

1282

3928

3929

-

7683

136

137
Table 5.3 shows the test generation time for each of the method for each of the subject
policies. The RC takes minimal test generation time as it has lesser number of tests. The
test generation time is roughly proportional to test suite size except for the SMT because of
the involved optimization of a test suite. All the testing methods are scalable except for the
SMT. As test generation time for iTrust3-10 is nearly one and half days, we decided not to
run SMT for iTrust3-20 because approximated time is nearly 10 days and this shows that
SMT is not scalable because of the involved mutation analysis for optimization of a test
suite size. However, for a policy with roughly hundred or lesser rules, SMT test generation
time is comparable to that of other testing methods.

Table 5.3:

Test generation time (in milliseconds)

Subject Policy

RC

NE-DC

DC

NE-

MC/DC

SMT

NO-SMT

MC/DC
conference3

488

438

408

689

716

2847

2019

fedora-rule3

328

548

686

652

536

2222

1628

kMarket-blue-policy

96

176

252

210

307

467

519

kMarket-gold-policy

71

154

221

150

221

343

385

kMarket-sliver-policy

130

252

328

231

335

704

626

sample

174

358

506

435

557

1835

1309

sample-fa

101

241

569

276

488

862

763

sample-dup

117

201

270

237

323

669

593

fedora-rule3-2

847

1062

1290

1790

1935

14853

4534

fedora-rule3-3

5368

7779

8120

9467

10304

930226

22625

iTrust3

1644

1555

3511

5923

8349

171716

10363

iTrust3-5

8711

8884

24415

49093

64749

15875846

48091
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iTrust3-10

13890

19089

84304

146987

211230

129655675

176758

iTrust3-20

45908

422653

562857

499790

696428

*

709927

139
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The next section presents the mutation score and summarizes whether the mutants type
(based on mutation operators) are killed or not by each testing methods.
5.2.2

Fault Detection Capability

Table 5.4 presents the mutation score for each testing method for each subject policy.
The mutation score for SMT and NO-SMT are 100% for all the policies, so we did not
include them in Table 5.4. It should be noted that we did not generate and run SMT test
suite for iTrust3-20. However, from NO-SMT, we know that for each mutant, there is at
least one test that kills it. So, it will be 100% as well.

Table 5.4:

Mutation Scores

Subject Policy

RC

NE-DC

DC

NE-MC/DC

MC/DC

conference3

75.82

75.82

78.02

97.8

100

fedora-rule3

64.37

85.06

85.06

88.51

88.51

kMarket-blue-policy

81.48

96.3

96.3

100

100

kMarket-gold-policy

80.95

95.24

95.24

95.24

95.24

kMarket-sliver-policy

81.25

100

100

100

100

sample

69.09

87.27

90.91

92.73

96.36

sample-fa

66.67

85.71

90.48

92.86

97.62

sample-dup

48.48

78.79

84.85

90.91

96.97

fedora-rule3-2

36.71

55.07

55.07

56.52

56.52

fedora-rule3-3

27.62

51.13

51.13

51.46

51.46

iTrust3

42.67

58.22

58.22

100

100

iTrust3-5

42.82

57.36

57.36

100

100
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iTrust3-10

42.83

57.25

57.25

100

100

iTrust3-20

42.84

57.19

57.19

100

100

142
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Table 5.5 presents the type of mutants that could not be killed by each testing method.
In Table 5.5, the results for three kMarket policies are combined into one. Further, iTrust3
and fedora-rule3-2 can represent other policies in the group of iTrust-X and fedora-rule3X from Table 5.1, hence only iTrust3 and fedora-rule3-2 are included. The absence of
mutation operator in Table 5.5 represents that all the mutants of the corresponding type are
killed by that method for that policy or the mutation operator is not applicable to the policy.
The mutation operator without asterisk implies all the mutants of the type are live. For
example, RTT specifies, all the mutants of type RTT are not killed. The mutation operator
with an asterisk means some are not killed while some are not. Single asterisk implies less
than 50% of the type of mutant are not killed and double asterisk implies half or more
percentage of mutants of the type are not killed.
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Table 5.5:

Live Mutants

Subject
Policy

Testing Method
RC

NE-DC

DC

NE-

MC-DC

MC/DC
Sample

RTT **

RTT **

RTT *

RTT **

RTT *

RPTE **

RPTE **

CRE*

CRE*

RTF*

RTF*

RTF*

RCT

RCT

RER*

RER*

RER*

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE*

RPTE*

FDR

FDR

FDR

FDR

FDR

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RCT
PTF
RPTE **
CRC ** {FA,
DUP, PUD}

Sample-dup

CRE*
RTT

RCT

CRC
Sample-fa

RTT**
RCT**
PTT
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Conference3

CRC**{DO,

CRC*{DO,

CRC*{D

ODO, PUD}

ODO }

O, ODO }

RPTE**

RPTE**

CRC* {FA,

CRC*{FA,

CRC*{FA

DUP}

DUP}

, DUP}

RPTE**

fedora-rule3-2 RTT**
RTF**

RTF**

RTF**

RTF**

RTF**

RER**

RER**

RER**

RER**

RER**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RTT*

RTT*

RTT*

RTT*

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RPTE**

RCT**

CRC {FA,
PUD}
Kmarket

RTT**
RCT*
PTT
RPTE**
CRC** {FA,
PUD}

iTrust

RTT
CRC
RPTE
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The mutation score increases for methods from left to right in Table 5.4 and live
mutants type decreases as we go from left to right in Table 5.5. The mutation scores ranged
from 27% to 81% for the RC tests and Table 5.5 shows that it could not kill a majority of
the mutants. The mutation scores for NE-DC, DC, MC/DC and NE-MC/DC ranged from
51% to 100%. However, this does not mean that they have similar fault detection
capability. It is clear from Table 5.4 that all the policies have greater (if not the same)
MC/DC (or NE-MC/DC) mutation score than that from DC (or NE-DC). It is also supported
from the result in Table 5.5 which implies that the difference between fault detection
capability among MC/DC and DC is the ability of MC/DC to detect the RPTE mutant type.
It is also noteworthy that error tests (from NE-DC and NE-MC/DC) do not always
necessarily contribute to fault detection. However, they are crucial for detecting faults
resulted from CRC mutation operator as well as RCT mutation operators. Hence, the error
version of the testing method is recommended for higher fault detection capability. Further,
if we do not consider fedora-rule3-2 policy, Table 5.4 shows that the mutation score of
MC/DC is above 90% in most of the policies. Further, Table 5.2 shows that MC/DC and
SMT have comparable tests size and Table 5.3 shows that test generation time of MC/DC
is much less than SMT. These data not necessarily but may lead to infer that MC/DC is
runtime efficient and cost-effective test suite for achieving above 90% mutation score and
provide high-quality assurance of XACML policies. However, we know from the fault
detection condition that MC/DC does not explicitly satisfy the propagation constraint for
fault detection. As a result, if we increase the size of the policy where reachability and
necessity constraint does not necessarily make the propagation constraint to be true like in
fedora-rule3, the mutation score of MC/DC dropped from 88% to 51%.
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Hence, though MC/DC is likely to achieve good mutation score in many policies, it
cannot assure that it will always lead to the high assurance of the XACML policies because
it explicitly satisfies only the reachability and necessity constraint. However, it should also
be mentioned that MC/DC satisfies the reachability and necessity constraint of the majority
of the faults that could be introduced by mutation operators in Table 3.1. Hence, we could
qualify MC/DC as near to weak mutation-based test generation method but that is not the
case with DC and RC. In fact, RC is far from satisfying necessity constraint for many of
the faults in Table 3.1.
5.2.3 Cost Effectiveness
While mutation score is a good indicator of the fault detection capability of a testing
method, it does not account for cost-effectiveness of the test suite i.e the number of mutants
killing capability of each test in a test suite. We consider the average number of Mutants
Killed Per Test (MKPT) as the indicator for cost-effectiveness.

Table 5.6:

MKPT Scores
Subject

RC

NE-DC

DC

NE-

MC/DC

SMT

NO-SMT

MC/DC
conference3

4.6

4.6

4.44

3.71

3.64

3.64

1.17

fedora-rule3

4.67

3.89

2.96

3.21

2.57

3.78

1.4

kMarket-blue-

5.5

3.71

2.6

3.38

2.45

3.86

1.29

5.67

3.33

2.22

3.33

2.22

4.2

1.31

5.2

3.56

2.46

3.56

2.46

4

1.39

sample

6.33

3.69

2.63

3.4

2.52

3.44

1.08

sample-fa

7

4

2.53

3.9

2.56

3.82

1.4

sample-dup

4

3.71

2.8

3.33

2.67

4.12

1.43

fedora-rule3-2

2.38

2.92

2.53

1.83

1.67

3.34

1.28

policy
kMarket-goldpolicy
kMarket-sliverpolicy

148

fedora-rule3-3

1.21

2.16

2.11

1.95

1.91

3.83

1.32

iTrust3

3

4.03

3.97

2.3

2.28

2.3

1.16

iTrust3-5

3

4.01

3.99

2.28

2.28

2.28

1.17

iTrust3-10

3

4.03

3.996

2.282

2.28

2.28

1.16

iTrust3-20

3

4.001

3.998

2.281

2.28

-

1.16
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Table 5.6 shows MKPT scores for various testing methods discussed in this work.
Further, it suggests that RC has good MKPT scores and in many policies, it even achieved
the highest scores among other testing methods. However, it does not mean RC will have
the best cost-effectiveness in all policies as it has lower MKPT scores in iTrust-X and
fedora-rule3-X. NO-SMT, on the other hand, could achieve perfect mutation score but has
lowest MKPT score in all the subject policies. DC (or NE-DC) has better MKPT than that
of MC/DC (or NE-MC/DC). SMT and MC/DC have similar MKPT scores in many policies,
however, SMT has either similar or better MKPT scores in all the subject policies than
MC/DC. Hence, this shows that MC/DC is nearly as cost-effective as near-optimal test
suite from SMT and so is the decision coverage. In fact, in some policies decision coverage
(specifically NE-DC) has better MKPT score than SMT in many policies. However, they
do not assure perfect mutation score in many policies and could not always provide highquality assurance of the XACML policies.
5.3

Threats to Validity
There are many threats to validity. First, XPA is based on the Balana [13] – OASIS

implementation of XACML and hence our results depend on the proper implementation of
Balana. While analyzing some of the results when executing policy against tests, we have
found some inconsistencies between XACML specification and results from the Balana.
Hence, the error in Balana implementation could propagate into the experimental results
that we presented in this chapter. Second, the subject policies do not necessarily represent
all possible real-world XACML policies. Some of them originate from real XACML
systems, others are demonstrating examples (e.g., kMarket) or synthesized (e.g., iTrustX,
fedora-rule3-X). We have developed some sample policies (e.g., sample, sample-fa) to
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capture the features not covered by policies in the literature of XACML. However, the
subject policies used in this research might still have not covered all language features of
XACML. Third, there is the possibility of different implementations for the coverage
criteria. Our result is based on the implementation of coverage-based test generation
methods in XPA. While we believe the proposed test generation algorithms reflect the
essential fault detection capabilities of the corresponding coverage criteria, different test
generation algorithms may lead to slightly different mutation scores and MKPT scores.
Fourth, all testing methods use Z3 as the constraint solver. Z3 is currently one of the most
efficient constraint solvers available. As different constraint solvers may result in different
attribute values for the same constraint, using another constraint solver in the
implementation may produce slightly different test suites and, thus, lead to slightly
different mutation scores. Fifth, although the 14 mutation operators have represented a
great variety of possible faults in XACML3.0 policies, they do not necessarily cover all
possible faults in real-world XACML3.0 policies. In addition, several mutation operators
in the literature [7] are not yet implemented in this work, including RUF (RemoveUniquenessFunction), AUF (AddUniquenessFunction), CNOF (Change-NOF-Function), and CLF
(ChangeLogicalFunction). Nevertheless, the formalization of the fault detection conditions
of incorrect rule targets and conditions has provided a foundation for dealing with these
types of mutants.
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CHAPTER 6

Conclusions
6.1

Summary
We have presented the approach to strong mutation testing of XACML3.0 policies and

have formalized the strong fault detection conditions based on a comprehensive fault model
of XACML 3.0 policies. On the one hand, these strong fault detection conditions have been
exploited to generate near-optimal test suites of specific policies. On the other hand, the
strong fault detection condition gave us insight into the fault detection capabilities of
existing testing methods. It is clear from the fault detection condition that MC/DC is near
to weak mutation-based test generation method because it satisfies the reachability and
necessity constraint for most of the faults in the fault model. However, that is not the case
with DC and RC. In fact, RC is far from satisfying necessity constraint for many of the
faults. This suggests that though MC/DC is likely to achieve good mutation score in most
of the policies, it still could not always assure high-quality of XACML policies as it does
not explicitly satisfy the propagation constraint.
Further, the generation of the near-optimal test suite has enabled us to perform
quantitative evaluations on the cost-effectiveness of the testing methods of XACML
policies. The results from the quantitative section suggest that MC/DC is nearly as costeffective as near-optimal test suite from SMT. SMT has perfect fault detection capability
and good cost-effectiveness, however, it may be practically infeasible to apply for larger
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policies with a larger number of the rules. The MC/DC including DC and RC is scalable
and cost-effective as close to the optimal test suite, however, they could not always assure
the high fault detection. Although MC/DC achieved good mutation score in most of the
policies, it performed badly in some of the policies. As a result, if perfect fault detection
capability is required and test suite size is not of prime concern, then we can use the NOSMT test suite. Hence, it is the trade-off between fault detection capability, costeffectiveness and test generation time.
The formulated fault detection conditions for fault model considered in this work is
not limited to the existing mutation operators. They provide theoretical guidelines for
developing new testing methods and dealing with faults created by new mutation operators.
6.2

Future work
In this work, we have determined the overall fault detection capability of RC, DC and

MC/DC based on whether they satisfy the reachability and necessity constraints of all the
mutation operators or not. However, this approach can be formally extended to
qualitatively evaluate the fault detection capability of each of the testing method relating
to fault type. The implication is that it neither needs to have a test suite nor the Oracle
values.
One of the other future works is to look at opportunities for further optimizing the
mutation-based test suite. Another research direction is to look for the opportunity to
optimize NO-SMT test suite without involving costly mutation analysis for the
optimization.
Finally, except the policies considered in this work, XPA would only be able to support
the analysis of policies which have syntax like one in the policies used in this work.
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However, XACML is a broad XML based specification which allows us to define various
policies using various functions, syntax not involved in any of the policies in this work.
As a result, extending the XPA to support various other functions and syntax in the policy
specification to make it more robust XACML analyzer tool could be another work for the
future.
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